在厘清股权激励对企业产品创新行为影响机理的基础上，本文采用案例研究方法，分析控股股东与管理层权力博弈结果对股权激励动机的影响，以及不同的股权激励设计动机对企业的产品创新行为的异质影响。研究发现，管理层权力主导和控股股东权力主导所造成的内部人控制问题，会使得股权激励沦为内部人谋取私有收益的工具，缩减提升公司竞争能力和可持续发展能力但风险高、周期长的产品创新的投入，进而削弱产品创新的成果转化能力。只有在控股股东发挥积极监督治理的环境中实施的股权激励才具备提升创新投入和产出成果转化能力的作用。

After clarifying the effect mechanism of managerial equity incentive on the product innovation ability, we using the case study of Shanghai Jahwa, analyze the effect of the power game between controlling shareholders and management on the motivation of managerial equity incentive contract design, and the effect of different design motivation on the product innovation ability. We find that, the problem of insider control caused by either the management or the controlling shareholders will make the managerial equity incentive contract as the tool for self-interest insider to seek private gains, and this will reduce the investment of product innovation, in turn to damage the transforming ability of product innovation to the profitability. The implementation of equity incentive only in the environment of controlling shareholders to play a monitoring role can improve the product innovation investment and the transforming ability of product innovation to the profitability.