科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (1): 108-118.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

CEO离职与公司继任决策研究——基于董事会结构特征的实证研究

张行   

  1. 中南财经政法大学，湖北 武汉430073
  • 收稿日期:2016-01-25 修回日期:2017-04-10 出版日期:2018-01-20 发布日期:2018-01-12
  • 通讯作者: 张行
  • 基金资助:

    中南财经政法大学基本科研业务经费项目“高管薪酬水平策略及其对公司治理结构优化影响研究”（2016.3-2017.3）；中国博士后科学基金项目“CEO继任、薪酬激励与绩效变动研究”（2014M562045;2014.9-2015.7）；国家社科基金后期资助项目“空间分布理论下区域金融发展与区域经济增长之间相互关系研究”（15FJL021；2015.12-2017.12）；中南财经政法大学“双一流”学科建设经费（公共管理学院暑期调研项目）“农户人力资本与农户收入分配变化跟踪研究”（16GL005；2016.7-2018.7）。

Consequence of CEO turnover and the company’s succession decision：An empirical analysis based on the features of board structure

Zhang Xing   

  1. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, Hubei, China
  • Received:2016-01-25 Revised:2017-04-10 Online:2018-01-20 Published:2018-01-12

摘要： CEO的能力水平和管理效率直接影响企业股票收益的变动，而由于某种原因引致的CEO离职行为更会导致股票收益变动，这一过程中继任决策类型是股票收益变动重要影响因素。而继任决策及其类型选择一般都由企业董事会提出并决定，所以，董事会结构特征对继任类型选择有很大影响，研究发现董事会中外部董事比重和权力特征是影响CEO继任选择的关键因素。基于对我国2000-2014年上市公司年报数据的分析，本文发现：1）CEO离职之后，公司的外部继任决策成为最优决策；2）外部董事的比重与外部继任CEO概率之间存在正向关联性，且外部继任CEO的概率随着外部董事比重的增加而呈现单调递增趋势；3）CEO的“自愿”和“强制”离职两种情况下，外部董事比重与外部继任概率之间都是单调递增的关系；4）从继任信息公布后的企业平均股票收益情况来看，企业股东会从外部继任决策中获益，而内部继任时企业股东利益会受到损害；5）企业规模越小，外部继任决策效用越高，而企业规制性程度越高，外部继任决策效用越低。

关键词: 董事会结构, 外部董事, 外部继任, 内部继任

Abstract: The level of ability and management efficiency of CEO directly affect the enterprise equity value and its changes, and also the decision executive of succession is decided by the board of directors, and largely be affected of the structure of the board, and also which the proportion and the power of outside directors in the board of directors are the key factors in the decision of executive succession. Based on the analysis about the annual report data of Listed Corporation (2000-2014), the paper find that：1）The outside succession decision is the optimal decision for company after the current CEO is turn off.；2）This paper believes that the correlation between the proportion of executive succession probability and external corporate board of directors of independent directors is positive.；3）The outside succession probability increased with the proportion of outside directors and presents a monotone increasing state. This kind of relation is monotonic in the current executives of voluntary and forced redundancy of two cases.；4）By analyzing the enterprise average stock return level after the announcement of the succession information, we find corporate shareholders will benefit from the external succession，but shareholders cannot benefit from the internal succession.；5）The smaller the size of the enterprise, the higher the utility of the external succession decision, but the higher the degree of corporate regulation, the lower the utility of the external succession decision.

Key words:  board structure, outside director, external succession, internal succession