构建多阶段动态博弈模型,研究竞争市场中,政府的战略性创新激励政策、价格管制政策和医保支付政策对制药企业创新激励和创新药市场绩效的综合作用机制。研究表明:价格管制并非总是降低制药企业的创新激励,在一定条件下,价格管制能够引导企业的创新投入实现社会最优配置；价格管制政策和医保支付政策合理匹配，可实现制药企业、医疗机构、患者、医保机构和政府的“多赢”；政府的战略性创新激励政策能够对制药企业的创新投入进行双向调节,引导其实现社会最优配置，进而提高制药企业的利润和社会总福利；当管制价格高于社会最优的管制价格时，提高医保福利水平和降低管制价格均会削弱战略性创新激励政策的实施效果。

In this paper, we propose a multi-stage dynamic game model to investigate the comprehensive mechanism of government’s strategic innovation incentives policy, price regulation policy, and health insurance policy on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation incentives and pharmaceutical market performance. We find that price regulation does not necessarily decrease the innovation incentives for pharmaceutical firms, and firms’ innovation investment may achieve the social optimal level under a reasonable price regulation. In addition, matching price regulation to health insurance may achieve multi-win among pharmaceutical firms, providers, patients, healthcare providers and the government. We also show that government’s strategic innovation incentive policy may dual-regulate the innovation investment of pharmaceutical firms, and induce them to the first best allocation, as well as enhance firms’ profits and the social welfare. Last, improving health insurance welfare or decreasing the regulated price, will reduce the welfare effects of the strategic innovation incentive policy.