将既有企业的创新政策划分为两类：“鼓励员工创新”政策和“拒绝员工创新”政策，是否采取“鼓励员工创新”政策成为既有企业的一项重要决策。本文通过构筑既有企业与员工的多期博弈模型，剖析了既有企业创新政策选择决策的影响因素。研究发现:机会转化为商业化发明的概率越大、可商业化的发明产生的收益越大，则既有企业越倾向于采取“鼓励员工创新”政策；在企业内部开发机会时员工分享的收益越大、给定项目的产出越大、有风险类型项目的风险越小、员工发现机会的概率越大，则既有企业越倾向于采取“拒绝员工创新”政策。最后讨论了本研究的管理启示与研究不足。

The enterprise has two different kinds of innovation policys :the policy of encouraging the employee innovation and the policy of refusing the employee innovation.To encourage the employee innovation or to refuse the employee innovation is an important decision for enterprise.Based on the multiphase game model of the enterprise and the employee,this paper analyzes what factor will influence the enterprise's choice on two different kinds of innovation policys.This study has found that the greater the probability that the opportunity become commercial invention,the enterprise is more likely to choose the policy of encouraging the employee innovation;the greater the benefit that commercial invention produces, the enterprise is more likely to choose the policy of encouraging the employee innovation.When the opportunity is developed in the enterprise,the greater the employee can share the benefit of project,the greater the output of a given project,the smaller the risk of the risky project, and the greater the probability that the employees will find the opportunitiy,the enterprise is more likely to choose the policy of refusing the employee innovation.In the end,the management implications and limitations of this study are discussed.