本文借助异质品双寡头Stackelberg竞争模型，在非完全自由贸易的背景下，考虑进口国关税和产品异质性对外国企业技术授权策略的选择以及技术授权对进口国社会福利的影响。研究表明：（1）固定收费方式下，只有在关税水平较高或技术创新程度较大时，市场机制才能促使技术授权发生；（2）特许权收费方式和双重收费方式都可以增加技术拥有企业的利润，但双重收费方式能够实现其利润的最大化；（3）无论以哪种方式进行技术授权，总可能损害进口国的社会福利；当技术创新程度较高或关税水平较大时，技术授权会损害进口国的社会福利。

This paper analyzes the effect of import taxes and differentiation on the licensing modes choice and social welfare with a differentiated duopoly model in the Stackelberg competition. It shows that fixed-fee can occur if import taxes are high and the goods are very different. Royalty and two-part tariff can increase the profit of foreign enterprise and two-part tariff gain the highest profit. However, three licensing modes may decrease the social welfare under the condition of high import taxes and differentiated goods.