研究生选择学术失范还是学术守范，是一个不断进行矛盾构建的过程，是利益相关者之间展开的一场博弈。本文分析了研究生与高校之间进行博弈的基本要素及相关参数，分别从完全理性假设、有限理性假设出发，探讨了研究生学术失范行为的分析模型，分析了研究生、高校的支付函数与收益情况。研究表明，收益的大小是影响研究生选择学术守范或失范行为的一个关键因素；当学术失范行为的收益一定时，加大惩罚力度，提升其支付成本，对减少学术失范行为具有显著影响；减少学术失范行为的查处成本，扩大查处概率，能够有效控制研究生学术失范。这些结论丰富了学术失范行为的理论研究体系，也为治理研究生学术失范行为提供了有益参考。

That graduates abide by academic rules or destruct them is an ongoing process of conflict and construct and also a game between stakeholders. This paper analyzes essential elements and related parameters of the game. It constructs the analytical model about graduates’ academic based on bounded rationality hypothesis and perfect rationality hypothesis, discussing graduates’ academic dishonesty , graduates’ and universities’ utility functions and benefits. The results show that: (1)The magnitude of income plays a key role in graduates’ choice of abide by destructing of academic rules; (2)When the academic dishonesty brings out a certain income, university should increase the punishment and the cost of academic abnormality to reduce dishonesty ;(3)Reducing the cost and increase the probability of investigation is an effective way to prevent academic dishonesty. These results have not only deepened and broadened the theory of academic anomie，but also provided helpful references for dealing with academic dishonesty．