摘要：本文放宽已有研究遵循的“双边垄断”假设，从替代交易费用和资产专用性的视角，在一个更为现实的市场结构中说明了农业自我实施合约产生的条件。企业和农户替代交易费用越高、资产专用性程度越高，履约价格区间越大，自我实施合约产生的可能性越大。企业和农户的讨价还价能力是自身替代交易费用和资产专用性程度的减函数，是对方替代交易费用和资产专用性程度的增函数。这些结论解释了“订单农业”履约率低的现象，为有效发展农业产业化提供了理论依据。

Abstract: This paper analyzed the condition of agricultural self-enforcing contract，which was based on the substitute transaction cost and asset specialty in the relaxation of the assumption of bilateral monopoly. The higher of substitute transaction cost and the extent of asset specialty, the wider of the self-enforcing contract price interval. The bargaining power was the decreasing function of substitute transaction cost and extent of asset specialty. These conclusions explained the low performance of order agriculture, and provide the theory basis for the development of agricultural industrialization.