国内外学者历来高度重视高管薪酬激励与企业财务业绩之间关系的研究,却长期忽视了高管薪酬激励对企业研发效率的潜在影响。本文通过手工搜集2004-2012年中国沪深两市A股全部工业上市公司的研发数据,运用Green(2005)提出的真正随机效应随机前沿分析模型,在控制公司个体异质性的前提下实证检验了高管货币报酬和持股对企业研发效率的影响效应。经验证据表明:高管货币薪酬与企业研发效率显著正相关;高管持股比例与企业研发效率之间呈现显著的倒U型关系。进一步的研究还发现,高管薪酬激励与企业研发效率之间的具体关联模式并非恒定不变,而是会受到区域市场化程度、所有制性质和行业特征等企业内外部环境因素的影响和制约。
Abstract
Scholars have always attached great importance to studying the relationship between executive compensation incentives and corporate financial performance, but ignore the potential impact of executive compensation incentives on corporate R&D efficiency. Based on the R&D data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share industrial listed companies from 2004 to 2012, this paper applies the true random-effects stochastic frontier model which proposed by Green(2005) to test the impact of monetary remuneration and equity incentive on R&D efficiency under the control of individual heterogeneity. Empirical evidence shows that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentive and R&D efficiency, and the monetary remuneration has a significant positive impact on R&D efficiency. Further study also shows that the association between executive compensation incentives and R&D efficiency is not constant, and it will be affected by regional marketization, ownership and industrial characteristics.
关键词
货币薪酬 /
股权激励 /
研发效率 /
真正随机效应随机前沿分析模型
Key words
monetary remuneration /
equity incentive /
R&D efficiency /
true random-effects stochastic frontier model
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基金
国家自然科学基金项目"地方市场分割制度环境对企业跨区域市场进入模式选择的影响与作用机理研究",(编号:71102052, 起止时间: 2012年1月-2014年12月); 教育部人文社科项目"粘性薪酬结构下中国上市公司高管R&D投资决策的冒险精神及其经济后果研究",(编号:14YJC630017, 2015年1月-2017年12月); 广东省哲学社会科学项目"中国工业企业研发效率动态演进的背后故事: 市场化改革的力量",(编号:GD13YGL01, 2014年1月-2015年12月); 广东省教育厅育苗工程项目"市场化改革、公司内部治理机制动态演进与中国企业效率变迁",(编号:2013WYM_0014, 起止时间: 2014年1月-2015年12月)。
