专利保护宽度的国际趋同与创新博弈

科研管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (9): 128-133.

专利保护宽度的国际趋同与创新博弈

赵旭梅

对外经济贸易大学国际经济研究院, 北京 100029

收稿日期:2015-04-27 修回日期:2015-08-27 出版日期:2015-09-25 发布日期:2015-09-18
作者简介:赵旭梅(1972-),女(汉),辽宁人,对外经济贸易大学副教授,研究方向:知识产权与创新管理。
基金资助:
国家社科基金项目2015-2018(15BJL105);国家自科基金项目2013-2018(71332007)。

International convergence of patent breath and game in innovation

Zhao Xumei

Institute of International Economics, University of International Business Economics, Beijing 100029, China

Received:2015-04-27 Revised:2015-08-27 Online:2015-09-25 Published:2015-09-18

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 专利保护宽度的国际趋同表现为各国对专利的保护范围收敛于同一稳态水平。本文基于专利的最优保护模型,论证了这一均衡的存在动因及收敛路径。本文首先通过量化专利保护宽度,说明其对创新收益、创新数量及社会福利的影响,然后构建反应函数,求出各国最优保护宽度的纳什均衡解,说明开放经济下,一国的最优保护宽度因市场规模和创新能力的不同而各异;统一高标准的保护宽度,虽然有助于技术领先国家增加创新的海外收益,却是以损害全球福利为代价,是国家间博弈后的次优结果;而使得全球福利最大化的保护宽度稳态水平介于各国的最优值之间。

关键词: 专利保护宽度, 国际趋同, 创新激励, 博弈均衡

Abstract: International convergence of patent protection breadth implies the standards of patent protection in each region would converge to the same level. This paper extends the model of optimal patents to explain the exist motives of this equilibrium and its convergence path. Firstly, the patent protection breadth is quantified to demonstrate its impact on innovative benefits, the amount of innovation and social welfare etc., and then in accordance with national selection, the reaction function of patent protection breath is calculated to obtain the Nash equilibrium result. The conclusion show that the optimal breath in a country is different with the variance of market size and innovative ability; meanwhile, the unified high standards of patent protection is the second-optimum results of the game among countries, which is propitious to countries advanced in technology to increase innovation earnings from overseas while it is detrimental to global welfare; the optimal protection standards maximizing global welfare is at an intermediate level of each region.

Key words: patent breadth, international convergence, innovation incentives, game equilibrium

中图分类号:

F410

赵旭梅. 专利保护宽度的国际趋同与创新博弈[J]. 科研管理, 2015, 36(9): 128-133.

Zhao Xumei. International convergence of patent breath and game in innovation[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(9): 128-133.

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