高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理研究

科研管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (8): 96-103.

高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理研究

刘井建, 焦怀东, 南晓莉

大连理工大学经济学院, 辽宁大连 116024

收稿日期:2013-12-23 修回日期:2015-02-02 出版日期:2015-08-25 发布日期:2015-08-19
通讯作者: 刘井建
作者简介:刘井建(1981-),男(汉),江苏铜山人,大连理工大学经济学院副教授,研究方向为公司治理。
焦怀东(1987-),男(汉),山西太原人,大连理工大学经济学院硕士生,研究方向为公司金融。
南晓莉(1981-),女(内蒙古),辽宁大连人,大连理工大学经济学院讲师,研究方向为公司金融。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金(71172136, 起止时间:2013.1-2015.12);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(DUT13RW418, 起止时间:2013.1-2014.12)。

Impacting mechanism of executive compensation incentive on corporate debt maturity

Liu Jingjian, Jiao Huaidong, Nan Xiaoli

School of Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, Liaoning, China

Received:2013-12-23 Revised:2015-02-02 Online:2015-08-25 Published:2015-08-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 代理理论认为公司债务期限受到债权人和股东之间委托关系的影响,但这是否包含了高管薪酬激励的信息呢?本文运用信号发送理论,提出了基于债权人预期的高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理,对我国2008-2012年实施股权激励计划公司的面板回归分析发现,高管现金薪酬对债务期限的影响呈倒U型,股权激励计划和股票增持有利于提高债务期限,但股权激励强度的影响却是消极的,验证了研究假设。最后就高管薪酬契约设计、债权人对公司信用评估以及信息披露提出了建议。

关键词: 债务期限, 高管薪酬, 股权激励

Abstract: From the traditional agency theory, debt maturity decision is influenced by the relationships between creditor and shareholder, but whether it includes the information of executive incentive compensation? This paper elucidates the impacting mechanism of executive compensation structure on debt maturity based on creditors' expectation. With the panel data analysis of listed companies that implemented the stock incentive plan from 2008 to 2012, results show that there is a reverse U-shape relationship between executive cash compensation and debt maturity, stock option plan and stake-raising are positive but incentive intensity is opposite, which is consistent with research hypotheses. Last, some advicesis put forward on the executive compensation design, credit rating by creditor, and how to improve information disclosure.

Key words: debt maturity, executive compensation, equity incentive

中图分类号:

F272.3

刘井建, 焦怀东, 南晓莉. 高管薪酬激励对公司债务期限的影响机理研究[J]. 科研管理, 2015, 36(8): 96-103.

Liu Jingjian, Jiao Huaidong, Nan Xiaoli. Impacting mechanism of executive compensation incentive on corporate debt maturity[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(8): 96-103.

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