科研管理 ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (4): 48-55.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择

杨慧军, 杨建君   

  1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西 西安 710049
  • 收稿日期:2013-03-13 修回日期:2014-10-16 出版日期:2015-04-25 发布日期:2015-04-18
  • 作者简介:杨慧军(1989-),男,河南周口人,西安交通大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向为公司治理和创新理论。
    杨建君(1963-),男,内蒙古兴和人,西安交通大学管理学院教授,博导,研究方向为公司战略和技术创新。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金(71272138),2013-2016;教育博士点基金(20110201110016),2012-2014。

Ownership concentration, managerial compensation and technology innovation choices

Yang Huijun, Yang Jianjun   

  1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, Shaanxi, China
  • Received:2013-03-13 Revised:2014-10-16 Online:2015-04-25 Published:2015-04-18

摘要: 基于委托代理理论及技术创新理论,探讨股权集中度对企业技术创新选择的影响。以182家制造企业及高新技术企业数据为样本,利用因子分析及结构方程模型对相关假设进行检验。结果表明:(1)经理人激励在股权集中度和技术创新之间具有中介效应;(2)股权集中度和经理人短期薪酬激励呈负相关,和经理人长期薪酬激励呈正相关;(3)短期薪酬激励不利于突变创新,长期薪酬激励有利于突变创新和渐进创新。

关键词: 股权集中度, 突变创新, 渐进创新, 经理人激励

Abstract: We analyze the impacts of ownership concentration on technological innovation based on the agency theory and innovation theories. By introducing managerial compensation as mediate variable, we construct the logical relationship of "ownership concentration-managerial compensation-technological innovation" . After testing our hypotheses utilizing data of 182 companies from Chinese manufacture and high-technology industries with EFA,CFA an SEM analyses,we find that managerial compensation mediate the relationship between ownership concentration and technological innovation;and ownership concentration is negativity related to managerial short-term compensation, but is positively related to managerial long-term compensation. Moreover, short-term compensation goes against radical innovation, but long-term compensation promotes both radical and incremental innovation.

Key words: ownership concentration, radical innovation, incremental innovation, managerial compensation

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