动态变化的竞争格局为银行债权人从对企业技术创新厌恶到创新包容提供了充分的演化动力。本文在分析银行债权治理对企业技术创新能力影响的基础上,探索了制度效应和资源效应在二者关系中的中介作用,进而辨析了银行债权治理的创新效应的产生机理。实证研究表明:银行债权治理对企业技术创新能力具有显著促进作用,银行债权人已由创新厌恶向创新包容演化;银行债权治理能够通过降低代理成本,优化企业原始制度安排的方式提升企业技术创新能力,即制度效应在二者关系中具有显著中介作用;银行债权治理并不能通过提升创新资源投入的方式促进企业创新,即资源效应的中介作用不显著。因此, "债权治理——制度效应——技术创新"的作用路径对创新包容效应更具理论解释力。研究结论能够从技术创新的角度对融资优序理论和银行代理监督理论进行回应和补充,并为企业创新和银行债权治理实践提供科学依据。
Abstract
Rapid-changing competition environment has provided banks sufficient power to make an evolution from aversion to tolerance towards enterprises' technological innovation. This paper has analyzed the impact of bank debt governance upon corporations' technological innovation capability, and then examined the mediation effects of agency cost and innovation input to identify the transmission path between debt governance and innovation. The results show that:(1) Bank debt governance can enhance corporations' innovation capability, which proves banks begin to be tolerant or supportive of innovation behavior. (2) Agency cost has a significant mediation effect between bank governance and innovation capability, which means bank debt governance can promote corporations innovation capability through governance optimization. (3) The mediation effect of innovation input is not significant. Not only have these results broadened pecking order theory of financing and bank monitoring theory, but also provided scientific evidence of technological innovation practice for corporations.
关键词
银行债权治理 /
创新包容 /
技术创新能力 /
影响路径
Key words
bank debt governance /
innovation tolerance /
technological innovation capability /
impact path
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(批准号:71272120,起止时间:2013.12-2016.12);教育部人文社科青年项目(批准号:14YJC630131,起止时间:2014.12-2017.12);山东省社会科学规划研究重大委托项目(批准号:14AWTJ01-10,起止时间:2014.06-2017.06)。
