家族企业股权融资偏好及治理效应的实证研究

葛永盛, 张鹏程

科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9) : 87-97.

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科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9) : 87-97.
论文

家族企业股权融资偏好及治理效应的实证研究

  • 葛永盛1, 张鹏程2
作者信息 +

An empirical study on family business’s equity financing preference and its governance effect

  • Ge Yongsheng1, Zhang Pengcheng2
Author information +
文章历史 +

摘要

相比较一般意义上的企业,家族企业不仅是一个企业系统,它还包含着家族伦理,具有家族和企业的二元特征。本文以2004-2010年我国A股家族上市公司为样本,采用非平衡面板数据,研究了二元特征下家族企业的股权融资偏好,并分析了外部投资者的进入对家族企业治理效率的影响。研究表明,国内家族企业在引进外部投资者时受到利他主义的调节作用。研究进一步发现,战略投资者的引进能够长期有效地提升家族企业的治理效率,而财务投资者的引进对家族企业治理效率的影响并不显著。

Abstract

Compared with businesses in a general sense, family business is not only a corporate system, but also embodies family ethics and characterized by duality of family and business. The paper takes A-share listed family companies in China from 2004 to 2010 as samples, draws on unbalanced panel data to explore equity financing preference of family business with dual characteristics, and analyzes the influence of the introduction of outside investors on the governance efficiency of family business. The research findings show that domestic family businesses were affected by the regulation of altruism while ushering in outside investors. The research further demonstrates that the introduction of strategic investors could promote the governance efficiency of family business effectively in the long run and that by contrast the introduction of financial investors could impact the governance efficiency of family business unremarkably.

关键词

家族企业 / 股权融资偏好 / 利他主义 / 治理

Key words

family business / equity financing preference / altruism / governance

引用本文

导出引用
葛永盛, 张鹏程. 家族企业股权融资偏好及治理效应的实证研究[J]. 科研管理. 2014, 35(9): 87-97
Ge Yongsheng, Zhang Pengcheng. An empirical study on family business’s equity financing preference and its governance effect[J]. Science Research Management. 2014, 35(9): 87-97
中图分类号: F275.5   

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基金

国家社会科学基金项目“新时期中国家族企业治理模式创新研究”(10CGL002,2010-2013);国家自然科学基金项目“投资者情绪、盈余市场反应与上市公司信息披露策略”(71172079,2010-2013);国家自然科学基金项目“机构投资者禀赋差异对其选股偏好及作用于公司效应的影响研究——来自后股改时期的证据”(71002052,2011-2014)。


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