科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (6): 68-76.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

财政补贴政策对企业研发投入的门槛效应

戴小勇, 成力为   

  1. 大连理工大学管理与经济学部, 辽宁 大连 116024
  • 收稿日期:2012-08-13 修回日期:2013-07-24 出版日期:2014-06-25 发布日期:2014-06-23
  • 作者简介:戴小勇(1987- ),男(汉),湖南邵阳人,大连理工大学管理与经济学部博士研究生,主要研究方向:金融发展、技术创新与管理。
    成力为(1960- ),女(汉),湖南津市人,大连理工大学教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向:国际金融理论与政策。
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社会科学基金项目“金融低效下的企业异质性投资行为与外部失衡:形成机理及调整政策研究”(批准号:11YJA790016;起止时间:2011.12-2014.12);辽宁省社科联项目“推动辽宁科技与金融结合问题研究”(批准号:2013lsldykt19;起止时间:2013.01-2013.09);国家自然科学基金重点项目“PORC框架下的国家自主创新体系国际化理论与政策研究”(批准号:71033002;起止时间:2011.01-2014.12);国家自然科学基金项目“外部治理环境、利益相关者声誉与上市公司盈余管理”(批准号:71172136;起止时间:2012.01-2015.12)。

The threshold effects of fiscal subsidy policy on corporate R&D investment

Dai Xiaoyong, Cheng Liwei   

  1. Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, Liaoning, China
  • Received:2012-08-13 Revised:2013-07-24 Online:2014-06-25 Published:2014-06-23

摘要: 使用我国2005-2007年约30万家工业企业数据,描述性统计得到:第一,单个企业受财政补贴的额度呈下降趋势,企业研发投入的资金来源中自筹资金比例上升;第二,财政补贴与企业研发投入分布存在较大的行业差异;第三,财政补贴严重向国有企业倾斜,国有企业是我国研发投入的主力军。虽然财政补贴在总体上能够促进企业研发投入,但门槛面板数据模型的估计结果表明:财政补贴与企业研发投入呈现复杂的非线性关系;对于制造业国有企业,财政补贴占企业研发投入的最佳比例是13.45%~27.75%,在此区间财政补贴显著带动企业研发投入,具有挤入效应,超过27.75%时对企业研发投入显著负向影响、挤出效应明显;但对私营企业、特别是私营高科技企业,财政补贴只有挤入效应、没有挤出效应。因此,提高财政补贴效率、促进企业自主研发的关键是,确立技术发明公共性补偿或风险补偿的合理定价机制,确保私营企业、特别是私营高科技企业得到合理的补偿。

关键词: 财政补贴, 研发投入, 分布特征, 门槛效应

Abstract: Using 30,0000 industrial enterprises' panel data from 2005 to 2007 in China, the descriptive statistics brought the following conclusions. Firstly, individual firm's internal self-raised fund gradually becomes the main source of R&D expenditure with decreasing fiscal subsidies. Secondly, the distribution of fiscal subsidies and enterprises' R&D investment vary from industries. Thirdly, State-owned enterprises account for the largest proportion of R&D expenditure and benefit most from fiscal subsidies. Though fiscal subsidies can stimulate the firms' R&D, estimation of threshold panel data model shows that the relationship between fiscal subsidies and firm R&D is non-linear. The optional ration of fiscal subsidies to firm R&D investment ranges from 13.45% to 27.75% for SOEs in manufacturing industries. Fiscal subsidies have a crowding-in effect on firm R&D investment in that interval, but exhibit a crowding-out effect when that ration exceeds 27.75%. There is only crowding-in but no crowding-out effect for privately-owned firms, especially high-tech privately firms. The threshold value to trigger crowing-out effect is larger in manufacturing industries than high-tech industries. Therefore, the key to promote the efficiency of fiscal subsidies and stimulate firm R&D investment is to properly price the compensation rate of R&D investment, and strength the support to privately-owned firms, especially firms in high-tech industries.

Key words: fiscal subsidies, R&D investment, distribution features, threshold effects

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