本文以中国A股上市公司为样本,运用联立方程组模型和三阶段最小二乘法,研究了CEO年薪报酬、研发投资强度与公司财务绩效之间的互动关系。研究发现:(1)高新技术企业的CEO年薪报酬与研发投资强度之间存在显著的正向互动关系;虽然非高新技术企业的CEO年薪报酬与研发投资强度之间存在负向互动关系,但关系不显著;(2)高新技术企业的研发投资强度对公司当期和上期财务绩效分别具有显著的负向和正向影响关系;当期和上期财务绩效对公司研发投资强度分别具有显著的负向和正向影响关系;而非高新技术企业的研发投资强度与公司财务绩效的互动关系相反,并且关系不显著;(3)高新技术企业的CEO当期年薪报酬与公司当期财务绩效之间存在显著的正向互动关系;虽然非高新技术企业CEO的当期年薪报酬与公司当期财务绩效之间存在正向互动关系,但关系较弱。本文研究结果不仅丰富了现有相关研究文献,而且在优化CEO年薪报酬契约,矫正公司研发投资不足和提高公司可持续盈利能力等方面,为高新技术企业提供理论支持和决策参考。
Abstract
This paper studies the interactions among CEO's annual remuneration, the intensity of R&D investment and company's financial performance using simultaneous-equation models and three-stage least-squares method with the samples from Chinese A-share listed companies. The research results suggest that: (1) There is a significant positive interactive relationship between CEO's annual remuneration and the Intensity of R&D investment in Hi-Tech enterprise, while such relationship is negative in non-Hi-Tech enterprises; (2) In Hi-Tech enterprises, the intensity of R&D investment has a significantly negative effect on the company's current financial performance and has a significantly positive effect on the company's future financial performance, and vice versa, while such relationships are reversed in the non-Hi-Tech enterprises and are insignificant; (3) There is a significant positive interactive relationship between the CEO's annual remuneration and the company's financial performance in Hi-Tech enterprises. Such relationship is less significant in non-Hi-Tech enterprises. Our results not only enrich relevant researches, but also provide the theoretical support and decision-making reference in optimizing the CEO's annual remuneration, correcting under-investment in R&D and promoting sustainable profitability for Chinese Hi-Tech enterprises.
关键词
CEO年薪报酬 /
研发投资强度 /
财务绩效 /
联立方程组
Key words
CEO's annual remuneration /
R&D intensity /
financial performance /
simultaneous-equation models
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基金
国家社科基金项目"高管薪酬契约设计、研发配置优化与公司价值创造",编号:13BGL051,起止时间:2013年6月-2016年6月;国家社科基金项目"货币政策传导效应中的社会资本作用机理研究",编号:14BGL037,起止时间:2014年6月-2017年6月;教育部人文社科项目"影响中国高新技术企业R&D投资水平的公司治理要素、机制和路径研究",编号:11YJA630070,起止时间:2011年11月-2014年12月;教育部人文社科项目"政府干预下的企业非效率投资行为研究",编号10YJA630203,起止时间:2010年11月-2013年12月。
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