在服务业中，多数产品或服务创新无专利保护，且几乎不存在模仿成本，当某一企业率先创新后，其他企业会纷纷模仿，因此创新激励不足。本文运用博弈论的方法，从创新成果被模仿企业即时模仿和滞后模仿两个层次研究了企业创新行为，得出在无产权保护条件下，如果创新成果的销售速度快于模仿者的模仿速度，有利于创新;模仿者进入模仿时间长，也有利于创新。
Abstract
In the service industry, most product or service innovation lacks the protection of property rights and the existence of imitating cost. When an enterprise makes any innovation, other enterprises will make instantaneous imitation, thus the enterprise is deficient of incentives to carry out product innovation. Based on the game theory, this paper studies the enterprise innovation at the levels where the innovation products are imitated by the imitating enterprises instantaneously or hysteretically and we have the conclusion that on the condition where there is no property right protection, if the innovator's sales speed is faster than the imitator's imitation speed, it is favorable for the innovation, and if it takes the imitators longer to make the imitation, it is also favorable for the innovation.
关键词
无专利保护 /
创新 /
模仿
Key words
unprotected property rights /
innovation /
imitation
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基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"区域战略性新兴产业技术创新联盟构建及治理机制研究：基于动态演化视角"(编号71262026)和江西省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地课题"中国广告产业竞争与规制政策研究"的研究成果。
