本文以AJ模型为基础,构建了纳入水平和垂直技术溢出的三阶段古诺竞争博弈模型,根据逆向归纳法求得的均衡解考察了不同合作研发模式下技术溢出对企业研发投资的影响和社会福利效应。结果表明:除了在不合作的情况下,企业研发投资总是随着垂直溢出的上升而增加;在混合与水平合作情况下,水平溢出有利于企业研发投资和社会福利的提高,垂直溢出的社会福利效应并不确定;在不合作与垂直合作情况下,水平溢出对研发投资和社会福利的影响不确定,而垂直溢出对社会福利具有正效应。
Abstract
Based on the AJ model, the three-stage Cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by using reverse induction, the effects of technology spillover on firm R&D investment and social welfare are investigated with different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except non-cooperation case, firm R&D investments always increase with the vertical spillover increasing. Under the conditions of mixed cooperation and horizontal cooperation, R&D investment and social welfare increase with horizontal spillover, however the effect of vertical spillover on social welfare is uncertain. Under the conditions of vertical cooperation and non-cooperation, the effect of vertical spillover on R&D investment and social welfare is uncertain, meanwhile social welfare always increases with the vertical spillover.
关键词
技术溢出 /
研发投资 /
社会福利
Key words
technology spillover /
R&D investment /
social welfare
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基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70803006,71073013),国家社科基金资助项目(10FJL011),中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(DUT10RW312)。
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