在不完全信息条件,从知识转移视角探讨权益结构和知识学习能力对技术创新联盟稳定性的影响,构建一个动态博弈模型。该模型将联盟成员的战略决策过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,拥有技术优势的企业决定转移核心技术还是普通技术进入联盟合作创新;第二阶段,联盟成员根据自身的学习和获利情况决定是维持还是退出联盟。探讨维持或退出联盟两种情形下的Cournot-Nash均衡结果,研究不同均衡状态下权益结构和知识学习能力对联盟稳定性的影响,以期为联盟运营及成员间动态合作关系的选择提供一定的理论支持。
Abstract
On the condition of incomplete information, a game model is used to investigate the impact of ownership level and learning ability on the stability of technology innovation alliance from a perspective of knowledge transfer. The decision-making processes of involved parties are divided into two stages in the model. In the first stage, the firm possessing advanced technology decides on the level of knowledge that transfers to its alliance partners. In the second stage, based on two factors, that is, the level of knowledge learned and profits gained, the alliance members decide on whether to maintain or terminate the alliance. The outcomes of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the model are able to reveal when the parties decide to maintain or terminate the alliance. The model explores the status of alliance stability under different ownership levels and learning abilities in order to provide theoretical support for the selection of optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship and alliance operations.
关键词
技术创新联盟 /
知识转移 /
联盟稳定性 /
动态博弈
Key words
technology innovation alliance /
knowledge transfer /
alliance stability /
dynamic Game
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基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(70872025,2009.1-2011.12); 教育部省部共建人文社会科学重点研究基地浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心项目(1010KUSM10014,2011.1-2011.12); 浙江省社科规划项目(09CGJJ007YB,2009.6-2011.6)。
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