本文建立了一个分析基于不同标准的双竞争专利联盟市场绩效的动态博弈模型。考虑一个由上下游两部分构成的完全信息垂直结构市场,其上游是专利标准许可市场,下游是差异化产品市场,运用逆向归纳法求解竞争性专利联盟情况下子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并与单一联盟情况下的市场绩效进行比较静态分析。研究表明,竞争性专利联盟具有更高的市场绩效:(1)双竞争联盟降低了联盟设置的许可费,有利于新企业进入下游产品市场,促进下游厂商的竞争;(2)双竞争联盟降低了联盟收益,促进了上游企业的竞争,将利润从上游企业向下游企业转移;(3)双竞争联盟降低了下游厂商的生产成本,降低最终产品的价格,增加了产品的社会总产量,提高了消费者剩余。
Abstract
A model of dynamic game theory is developed to analyze market performance of Double Competitive Patent Pools (DCPP). The market structure consists two parts, one is the upstream market of patent standard licensing, and the other is the downstream market of differentiated products based on different standards. Backward induction is used to solve sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under DCPP and compare with the market performance of single patent pool by means of comparative static analysis. The conclusion indicates that DCPP has better market performance. For the downstream market, there are lower license royalty, lower profit, and more competitions, meanwhile for same market, there are more enterprises that enter into, lower final product price, more output, and better consumer surplus.
关键词
技术标准 /
单一专利联盟 /
双竞争专利联盟 /
市场绩效
Key words
technical standard /
single patent pool /
DCPP /
market performance
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参考文献
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基金
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20100042110012);国家社科基金后期资助项目(10FJY003)。
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