科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5): 86-94.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

论知识产权侵权与反侵权的成本——收益博弈

张伟1,2, 孙燕玲1   

  1. 1. 山东科技大学 文法学院,山东 青岛 266590;
    2. 南京大学 经济学院,江苏 南京 210093
  • 收稿日期:2010-01-15 修回日期:2012-02-14 出版日期:2012-05-27 发布日期:2012-05-20
  • 基金资助:
    本文系山东科技大学科学研究"春蕾计划"项目(项目编号:2010AZZ165)"高校科研优势与区域经济发展的互动机制研究"阶段性成果。同时,本文也得到"山东科技大学文法学院科研基地学术基金"和青岛市"双百"调研工程基金项目(项目编号:2010-B-04)"构建青岛城镇居民低碳消费方式问题与对策研究"的相应资助。

The game of cost-profit about intellectual property rights betweeninfringement and anti-infringement

Zhang Wei1,2, Sun Yanling1   

  1. 1. School of Humanity and Law, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China;
    2. School of Economics, Nanjing University, Jiangsu Nanjing 210093, China
  • Received:2010-01-15 Revised:2012-02-14 Online:2012-05-27 Published:2012-05-20

摘要: 由于信息不对称以及市场利益导向偏差的存在,知识产权侵权问题屡禁不止。通过成本-收益的博弈模型集中分析潜在侵权和反侵权行为的选择倾向,并从模型分析中得出若干结论,从而内在性地解释了知识产权侵权和反侵权的直接动因问题,同时也为加强知识产权保护提供了更明确的经济思路。

关键词: 知识产权保护, 成本—收益, 潜在侵权, 博弈模型

Abstract: Because of information asymmetry and deviation of market-oriented interests, the infringements of intellectual property right appear repeatedly and are unable to stop. By analyzing the choice tendency of potential infringement and anti-infringement comparatively through the game model of cost-profit, some conclusions are drawn from the analyses and an inherent explanation for the behavior of infringement and anti-infringement resulted from direct and dynamic causes is obtained. At the same time it could provide a quite clear economic approach to intellectual property right protection.

Key words: intellectual property right protection, cost-profit, potential infringe, game model

中图分类号: