科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (3): 65-71.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

高新技术企业中知识分享微观机制研究

吴丙山, 赵骅, 罗军   

  1. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院,重庆 400044
  • 收稿日期:2011-09-14 修回日期:2011-12-23 出版日期:2012-03-27 发布日期:2012-03-24
  • 作者简介:吴丙山(1973-),男(汉),博士,江西萍乡人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,主要研究方向为技术经济、知识管理。
    赵 骅(1964-),男(汉),博士,安徽蚌埠人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为技术创新管理、战略管理。
    罗 军(1980-),男(汉), 四川安岳人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院2005级博士生,主要研究方向为技术经济、知识管理。
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社科基金(编号08JA630093,起止时间2009.01-2011.12),教育部博士点博导类基金(编号20100191110039,起止时间2011.01-2013.12)。

Micro-mechanism of knowledge sharing in high-tech enterprises

Wu Bingshan, Zhao Hua, Luo Jun   

  1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Received:2011-09-14 Revised:2011-12-23 Online:2012-03-27 Published:2012-03-24

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摘要： 论文从主从博弈的视角,将高新技术企业运营的基础单位知识团队作为研究对象,运用博弈中的主方和从方来刻画知识团队中成员间知识水平的差异,通过分析各方投入、绩效分配、安全系数等对知识分享的影响,建立起高新技术企业知识团队中知识分享决策的主从博弈微观模型,并进行仿真分析,探索高新技术企业知识分享过程中的内在微观机理及其影响机制。论文研究发现成员的知识分享绩效分配系数与知识分享投入正相关,知识分享安全指数对知识分享投入与知识分享收益均有积极的影响;知识团队中知识分享前提条件是知识优势方的绩效分配系数应足够大,且该绩效分配系数与所有跟随者的绩效分配系数之和的比值应大于知识转化系数;研究结论为高新技术企业的知识分享策略制定提供决策参考。

关键词: 高新技术企业, 知识团队, 知识分享, 主从博弈

Abstract: From the perspective of Stackelberg games, the micro-mechanism of knowledge sharing in high-tech enterprises is researched and by taking the knowledge teams as the research object, the leader and the follower are used to describe the different levels of knowledge teams' member. By analyzing the effect of all inputs, performance allocation, and safety coefficient on knowledge sharing, a Stackelberg game model of decision-making in knowledge sharing is established and the simulation analysis is conducted to explore high-tech enterprises in the process of knowledge sharing micro-mechanism. The results show that firstly, the member's performance partition coefficient is a positively correlated with the input in knowledge sharing. Secondly, the safety coefficient has a positive impact on input and earning in knowledge sharing. There is a prerequisite that performance partition coefficient of the leaders should be large enough for entive knowledge teams. At the same time, the ratio of performance partition coefficient between the leaders and all the followers should be larger than knowledge conversion coefficient. These conclusions could provide the reference to decision makers for the knowledge sharing strategies of high-tech enterprises.

Key words: high-tech enterprise, knowledge team, knowledge sharing, Stackelberg game

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