供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 50-58.

供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型

李柏勋¹, 周永务², 王圣东³

1. 广东商学院工商管理学院,广东广州 510320;
2. 华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州 510640;
3. 解放军电子工程学院,安徽合肥 230037

收稿日期:2010-10-13 修回日期:2011-01-12 出版日期:2012-12-27 发布日期:2012-12-17
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(70971041:2010-2012;71072165:2011-2013)。

The decision model of vertical structure under Stackelberg game among supply chains

Li Baixun¹, Zhou Yongwu², Wang Shengdong³

1. School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Business, Guangzhou 510320, China;
2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China;
3. Department of Mathematics, Electronic Engineering Institute of PLA, Hefei 230037, China

Received:2010-10-13 Revised:2011-01-12 Online:2012-12-27 Published:2012-12-17

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以两条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,讨论了两供应链采用不同决策结构时链间Stackelberg博弈问题,并对链间博弈四种决策结构(分散—分散、分散—集中、集中—分散、集中—集中)进行比较分析。研究结果表明,1)对于领导者供应链来说,集中决策是其占优策略;2)对于追随者供应链来说,采用集中决策还是分散决策,则取决于产品可替代性的高低和领导者供应链的选择;3)当产品替代度较低时,集中—集中结构是链间单次和多次重复博弈的均衡解;当产品替代度较高时,集中—分散结构是链间单次博弈均衡解,而分散—分散结构则是多次重复博弈均衡策略。

关键词: 多供应链, 价格竞争, 决策, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: By taking two supply chains as a research object, each of them containing one manufacturer and one retailer, the problem involving Stackelberg game is discussed, when two supply chains adopt different decision structures, respectively. In particular, four decision structures between these two supply chains are analyzed, including the structures of decentralized-decentralized, decentralized-centralized, centralized- decentralized, centralized-centralized. It is found that (1) centralized decision is the dominate strategy for the leader supply chain;(2) as for the follower supply chain, whether adopting centralized decision or decentralized decision, it is depended on the substitutability degree of products and the selection of the leader supply chain; (3) when the substitutability degree of product is low, the structure of centralized-centralized is the equilibrium solution of single and repeat games; and when the substitutability degree of product is high, the structure of centralized-decentralized is the equilibrium solution of single game; while the structure of decentralized -decentralized is the equilibrium solution of repeat games.

Key words: multi-supply chains, price competition, decision, Stackelberg game

中图分类号:

F272.3

李柏勋, 周永务, 王圣东. 供应链间Stackelberg博弈下纵向结构决策模型[J]. 科研管理, 2012, 33(12): 50-58.

Li Baixun, Zhou Yongwu, Wang Shengdong. The decision model of vertical structure under Stackelberg game among supply chains[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, 33(12): 50-58.

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