科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (4): 10-15,27.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业技术创新项目政府资助强度决策研究

王楠1,2   

  1. 1. 北京工商大学商学院, 北京 100048;
    2. 北京工商大学中国创业投资研究中心, 北京 100048
  • 收稿日期:2011-05-31 修回日期:2011-10-25 出版日期:2012-04-27 发布日期:2012-04-20
  • 基金资助:
    北京市哲学社会(11JGC099);北京市教委(SQSM201210011002);本研究调研受北京市教委科研平台-境外资产管理研究平台资助。

The decision making of government subsidization intensityon enterprise technological innovation projects

Wang Nan1,2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China;
    2. China Center for Venture Capital Reserch, Bijing 100048, China
  • Received:2011-05-31 Revised:2011-10-25 Online:2012-04-27 Published:2012-04-20

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摘要： 本文首先运用实物期权思想构建政府保障资助效率模型,分析政府保障资助效率的决定因素,讨论政府保障资助的期权价值与保障资助强度间的关系。然后建立政府和企业资助强度博弈模型,分别讨论技术创新两阶段下政府和企业的博弈行为,分析政府资助强度决策的重要考虑因素,并得出项目投资的平均利润等于边际利润是政府和企业投入的平衡点。最后从政府角度给出了关于政府资助强度的建议。

关键词: 政府资助, 技术创新, 资助强度, 实物期权, 博弈论

Abstract: By adopting the real option method, firstly, the model of government guarantee subsidization efficiency is setup, the determinants of government guarantee subsidization efficiency are analyzed and the relationship between the option value of government guarantee subsidization and guarantee subsidization intesity is discussed. Then the game model of government and enterprise's subsidization efficiency is built, the game behaviors of government and enterprise in the two phases of technological innovation are discussed, and the important determinants of government subsidization intensity are analyzed. The following the conclusion is drawn, that is, the investment balance of government and enterprise is that the average profit of the project investment is equal to the marginal profit. Finally, from the perspective of the government, the suggestion on government subsidization intensity is given.

Key words: government subsidization, technological innovation, subsidization intensity, real option, game theory

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