我国国有企业绩效管理能否推行依赖于代理人的动机,这种动机由代理人损益决定,技术因素只是影响损益的因素之一。通过搭建代理人推行绩效管理的损益模型,刻画了国有企业诸多特性对于代理人损益的影响。通过对典型国有企业G机场集团推行绩效管理的过程进行实地跟踪研究,证实了这些影响的存在,明确了影响机制,为国有企业绩效管理困境成因给出了一种解释。绩效管理对代理人来说是长期投资,国有企业的产权属性和组织文化使投资期过于漫长,加上代理人的短期行为倾向和有限理性,导致绩效管理普遍被放弃。从根本上说,公有制经济中各级代理人剩余索取权的缺失是国有企业绩效管理困境的根本成因。
Abstract
The implementation of performance management of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOE) depends on the agent's motive. This motive rests with the cost-benefit for the agent, and technical factor is just one of the factors affecting the cost-benefit. By establishing the cost-benefit model based on the agent implementation of performance management, several influences caused by the features of SOE on the cost-benefit of the agent are depicted. By the field tracking research on the process for implementing performance management of a typical SOE i.e. G Airport Group, the existence of these influences is confirmed, their mechanism is defined, and the dilemma of performance management in SOE is explained. For the agents, performance management is a long-term investment. The property right attribute and organizational culture of SOE make the investment period too long, with the short-term behavior tendency of the agent and their limited rationality, all of which lead to the loss of the performance management project. Essentially, the absence for the right of agent’s residual claims is the root which causes the dilemma of performance management in SOE.
关键词
国有企业 /
绩效管理困境 /
代理人损益
Key words
state-owned enterprise /
dilemma of performance management /
cost-benefit for agent
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基金
国家自然科学基金"竞争性战略联盟的合作效应与效率边界研究"(项目批准号:70672012)。
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