谈判视角下风险投资股权配置及其成因——基于浙江数据的实证研究

科研管理 ›› 2011, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (12): 82-88.

谈判视角下风险投资股权配置及其成因——基于浙江数据的实证研究

徐梦周

中共浙江省委党校, 浙江杭州 311121

收稿日期:2011-02-13 修回日期:2011-07-28 出版日期:2011-12-27 发布日期:2011-12-23
作者简介:徐梦周(1985- ),女,浙江温州人,中共浙江省委党校讲师,博士,风险投资。
基金资助:
国家社科基金"战略性新兴产业培育机制与路径研究"(编号:11CJL058);浙江省自然科学基金"浙江省创投机构网络式治理与绩效提升的内在机制研究"(编号:Y6110805);浙江省哲学重点基地"浙江省科学发展观与浙江发展研究中心"资助。

Venture capital equity allocation and its causes:an empirical study from negotiation perspective using data of Zhejiang Province

Xu Mengzhou

Party School, Zhejiang Provincial Committee of CPC, Hangzhou 311121, China

Received:2011-02-13 Revised:2011-07-28 Online:2011-12-27 Published:2011-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 股权配置是风险投资中的关键性问题,然而现有研究更多强调最优股权安排和制度设计,忽略对现实配置状态及其成因的关注。本研究从谈判视角构建了风险投资股权配置及其谈判力来源的理论框架,并结合浙江省数据进行实证分析,发现资金因素和人力资源因素在股权配置中有着不同作用机制。在资金方面,风险投资机构资金投入与风险投资机构股权比例存在正相关,但随创业企业发展相关性逐步趋弱。创业企业资金并非显著谈判力来源;在人力资源方面,创业者创业经历与风险投资机构股权比例存在负相关,随着创业企业发展相关性同样逐步趋弱。风险投资机构从业经验与其股权比例存在显著负相关。

关键词: 风险投资, 股权配置, 谈判力

Abstract: Equity allocation is a key issue in venture capital, however, current research focuses on optimal arrangement and institution design, ignories the reality and its causes. A theoretical framework is built to analyze the sources of bargaining power and equity allocation from the perspective of negotiation. Combined with an empirical analysis of sample data from Zhejiang Province, several results are achieved.Financial and human resources have different effects on equity allocation. The venture capital firms' investment amount is positive correlated with their equity proportion, and the correlation will become weaker with the development of start-ups. The entrepreneur's investment amount is not a source of significant bargaining power. The entrepreneur's business experience is negative correlatied with venture capital firm's equity proportion ,and the correlation will also become weaker with the development of start-ups.Venture capital firms' experience is significantly negative correlatied with their equity proportion.

Key words: venture capital, equity allocation, bargaining power

徐梦周. 谈判视角下风险投资股权配置及其成因——基于浙江数据的实证研究[J]. 科研管理, 2011, 32(12): 82-88.

Xu Mengzhou. Venture capital equity allocation and its causes:an empirical study from negotiation perspective using data of Zhejiang Province[J]. Science Research Management, 2011, 32(12): 82-88.

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