本文分析了在知识链组织研究与开发协作中,基础阶段的研究由代理组织承担,应用开发阶段的创新由核心企业完成的投入决策过程。研究表明:在序贯博弈情形下,核心企业所获得的收益越多,基础研究阶段的投入产出的弹性系数越高,核心企业对代理组织的补贴越多;核心企业和代理组织在合作博弈情形下比序贯博弈情形下所投入的研发费用更多;此外,合作博弈所产生的创新收益增量部分的合作租金的分配比例与风险厌恶程度负相关,与讨价还价能力无关,合作租金的溢价补贴部分与风险规避程度、讨价还价能力同时相关。

The inputting decision process of research and development collaboration between the core enterprise and the agent in the knowledge chain is analyzed. In the collaboration process, the agent takes the responsibility of research in the basic stage and the core enterprise undertakes the innovation in the application and development stage. The research indicates that the higher the research stage benefits the core enterprise gains, the higher the elastic coefficient of input-output at the research stage is, the core enterprise gives more subsidies to the agent under sequential game. Both the core enterprise and the agent are willing to invest more under cooperative game than that under sequential game. Moreover, the distribution coefficient of cooperative rent from incremental innovation income produced by cooperative game is negatively correlated to the risk aversion degree, and it has nothing to do with the bargaining ability, meanwhile, the premium subsidy has a positive correlation to the risk aversion degree and the bargaining ability.