摘要：企业集群共性技术合作创新成功后，群内企业的行动选择有两种：遵守合作契约或采取道德风险行动。本文通过单阶段与多阶段无限博弈分析，得出了企业集群上下游企业纵向共性技术合作创新与竞争企业横向共性技术合作创新后道德风险行动的战略均衡。然后，对此两种不同类型的共性技术合作创新后的道德风险防范，本文通过委托代理理论建立了各自的最优惩罚契约模型，并从无惩罚契约和惩罚契约完备两种类型的企业集群共性技术合作创新为集群代理机构提供了相关管理建议。

Abstract: With the success of cooperation innovation about generic technology in an enterprise cluster, every enterprise has two options: abiding with a cooperation contract or taking action of moral hazard. The single-session and unlimited multi-session game analysis are used to get the Nash equilibrium of moral hazard behavior after cooperation innovation about generic technology in the enterprise cluster between competitive enterprises or non-competitive enterprises.Then, for the governance of moral hazard after different cooperation innovation about generic technology in the cluster, the most prior punishment contract model is set up to prevent the moral hazard behavior based on the principal-agent theory. And relevant policy recommendations for the cluster agency on both types of cooperation innovation contract without any punishment and with a complete puniishment are provided.