摘要：文章在扩展风险投资家与风险企业家风险偏好的基础上，通过引入分段股权融资、控制权收益以及风险投资家监督成本、风险规避成本与战略性收益等变量，基于不完全契约的视角将Tirole（2001）企业融资模型扩展为两期动态过程。基于分段融资的信息发现过程建立两阶段风险企业控制权配置模型，分析初始阶段与中期信号显示阶段风险企业家自有财富、运营企业的非货币收益、人力资本专有性与专用性以及风险投资的专用性、风险规避度与战略性收益等因素对高新技术风险企业控制权配置的影响，得到了一系列结论，为有关高新技术风险企业治理已有的研究提供了有益的补充。

Abstract: By introducing the equity stage financing, benefits of control rights, monitor cost, risk aversion coefficient, and strategic objectives benefits of venture capitalist, based on extending the risk preferences of venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist, the corporation financing model of Tirole（2001） is expanded into a two-stage dynamic process from the perspective of incomplete contract. From building the model of control rights allocation in Venture Capital(VC)-backed new and high tech firms based on the progress of information finding in the stage financing, the factors, which are venture entrepreneur’s own fortune, non-monetary private benefits of running a firm, exclusion and specificity of human capital, and the investment specificity of VC, risk aversion coefficient and strategic benefits, impact on control rights allocation in first and second period of stage financing are analyzed, a series of the conclusions gained in here provide useful reference to VC-backed new and high tech firms governance.