科研管理 ›› 2010, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (1): 64-68 .

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励作用分析

杜晓君,梅开   



  1. (东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁 沈阳110004)
  • 收稿日期:2008-07-22 修回日期:2009-04-23 出版日期:2010-02-02 发布日期:2010-02-02

Analysis on the innovation incentive effect of patent pools based on a vertical structure

Du Xiaojun, Mei Kai   


  1. (School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China)
  • Received:2008-07-22 Revised:2009-04-23 Online:2010-02-02 Published:2010-02-02

摘要: 摘要:通过引入专利联盟成员的实质性专利产出函数研究纵向结构专利联盟的创新激励作用问题。考虑三阶段动态博弈模型:在第一阶段,专利联盟成员选择研发投入;在第二阶段,专利联盟设定单位联盟许可费率;在第三阶段,专利联盟成员在下游最终产品市场进行古诺竞争决定他们的产量。结果表明:在专利许可费收入按数量比例规则分配的条件下,纵向结构专利联盟鼓励其成员进行研究与开发,对创新有激励效应。

关键词: 纵向结构, 专利联盟, 创新激励, 古诺竞争

Abstract: Abstract: The problem involving the innovation incentive effect of patent pools based on a vertical structure was studied by introducing the essential patent output function of the patent pool members. A three-stage dynamic game model was considered: in the first stage, the patent pool members select R&D inputs; in the second stage, the patent pool sets up the unit pool royalty rate; in the third stage, the patent pool members conduct Cournot competition to determine their quantities in the downstream final goods market. In conclusion, under the condition dividing the royalty income according to the numeric proportional rules, the patent pool based on the vertical structure encourages its members to engage research and development; it has an incentive effect on the innovation.

Key words: vertical structure, patent pool, innovation incentive, Cournot competition

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