摘要：随着政府资助专利费用政策在我国各地方的普遍实施，资助范围越来越广，资助额度越来越高，但学界对其合理性的质疑也越来越多。本文通过建立简单的博弈模型分析了专利费用对社会福利的影响机理，发现政府资助专利费用通过直接影响创新者的专利申请行为，可能会间接地降低社会福利水平。在此基础上，本文提出了提高我国专利费用标准，明确政府资助专利费用重点的政策建议。

Abstract: Withthe subsidy scope increasingly expanded and the subsidy amount increasingly high, the policy of the patent fees funded by government is widespread implementedin China and is increasingly questioned in academic circles. The effect mechanism of the patent fees upon social welfare is analyzed through a simple game model, and it is found that the patent fees subsidy policy implementedby government can indirectly reduce the level of social welfare by directly affecting the patent application behavior of innovators. On this basis, it is suggested that the government should raise the patent fees standard and clarify the subsidy priority of patent fees.