本文研究开发了两阶段序列投资道德风险模型。基于价格和成本这两个影响R&D项目价值的关键因素，建立道德风险模型，并比较专有权、共同所有权和期权合同（Option Contract）三种R&D联盟组织结构，分别讨论结盟的两公司的投资决策及其投资的相互依赖性，和关键的协议参数对两公司最优投资水平的影响。并证明了期权合同组织结构占优于其他所有权组织结构。从而对期权合同近年来使用越来越多的原因给出了理论解释。  

    A two-period moral hazard model with the sequential investment in the R&D alliance is studied. This moral hazard model is based on the price and cost that are two key factors affecting the R&D value. The governance structures in R&D alliance under exclusive or joint ownership and option contracts are analyzed and compared, the investment decisions of firm A and firm B, and the effect of key parameters on their first-best investment levels are discussed. Finally, it is proved that option contract strictly dominates other ownership structure. The results offer a theoretical explanation why partners in the R&D alliance frequently use contingent ownership structures to govern their relationship, and why their initial arrangement is often modified over the time.