本文探讨了在电子政务服务外包过程中政府和ASP之间的委托代理关系，建立了相应的博弈模型，并分别分析了在信息对称、政府向ASP支付固定服务费用及信息不对称的条件下，政府和ASP之间的博弈关系以及在不同的情况下政府应如何设计相应的激励机制，促使ASP提供高水平的电子政务服务，最大限度地满足政府的社会福利需求及ASP的效益需求，实现政府和ASP的双赢。

A model of principal-agent theory between government and the Application Service Provider(ASP) is proposed. It is proved through the game analysis that the government fee policy to ASPs is the key reason to keep the better relationship with ASPs. The incentive mechanisms under the conditions of information symmetry, the fixed fee paid by government branches, and information asymmetry were analyzed。 These incentive mechanisms would make ASP provide E-government services with high efficiency so that government and ASP could have a victory for both sides.