研究什么样的专利许可契约有利于促进高校专利实施具有重要的实际价值。本文应用委托-代理理论,从专利许可的角度构建了基于发明者和专利受让方道德风险的高校专利转化的博弈模型,通过对均衡结果的求解,揭示正是道德风险导致了高校专利转化低效的可能性;从激励的角度对最优许可契约的特征进行了分析;最后结合我国实际提出了约束发明者与受让方道德风险行为、进而促进专利实施的政策建议。

It has a great practical value to study what kind of patent licensing can put university patent into practice. Applying the theory of principal-agent, a model of implement of university patents is built up based on the moral risk of inventors and licensees from the perspective of patent licensing. By finding the solution for the equilibrium result, it is indicated that the problem of moral risk leads to inefficiency of patents implement. Through analysis of the characteristics of optimal licensing contract, some practical suggestions on how to constraint moral risk are brought forward for promoting the implement of patent.