科研管理 ›› 2008, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 82-88 .

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

具有序列投资的R&D联盟组织结构研究 /FONT /P

  薛明皋,龚朴     

  1.     华中科技大学管理学院,湖北 武汉430074  
  • 收稿日期:2007-05-01 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-11-20 发布日期:2008-11-20

Study on the R&D alliance governance structure with the sequential investment

Xue Minggao, Gong Pu   


  1. Department of finance, school of management, Huazhong University of
    Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
  • Received:2007-05-01 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-11-20 Published:2008-11-20

摘要:     本文研究开发了两阶段序列投资道德风险模型。基于价格和成本这两个影响R&D项目价值的关键因素,建立道德风险模型,并比较专有权、共同所有权和期权合同(Option Contract)三种R&D联盟组织结构,分别讨论结盟的两公司的投资决策及其投资的相互依赖性,和关键的协议参数对两公司最优投资水平的影响。并证明了期权合同组织结构占优于其他所有权组织结构。从而对期权合同近年来使用越来越多的原因给出了理论解释。  

关键词: R&, D联盟, 道德风险, 专有权, 共同所有权, 期权合同

Abstract:     A two-period moral hazard model with the sequential investment in the R&D alliance is studied. This moral hazard model is based on the price and cost that are two key factors affecting the R&D value. The governance structures in R&D alliance under exclusive or joint ownership and option contracts are analyzed and compared, the investment decisions of firm A and firm B, and the effect of key parameters on their first-best investment levels are discussed. Finally, it is proved that option contract strictly dominates other ownership structure. The results offer a theoretical explanation why partners in the R&D alliance frequently use contingent ownership structures to govern their relationship, and why their initial arrangement is often modified over the time.    

Key words: R&D alliance, moral hazard, exclusive ownership, joint ownership, option contract

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