科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 156-162.

• 论文 • 上一篇    

高技术计划项目分段投资的激励契约设计

殷红   

  1. 华东师范大学商学院,上海 200241
  • 收稿日期:2010-08-08 修回日期:2011-01-30 出版日期:2012-02-27 发布日期:2012-02-28
  • 作者简介:殷 红(1976-) , 女(汉) , 湖北随州人, 华东师范大学商学院讲师, 研究方向为信息经济学、网络经济等。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金项目"网络交易中的企业道德风险防范和信誉分析研究"(10CGL014):2010.6-2012.12。

Incentive contract design for staged investment in hi-tech projects

Yin Hong   

  1. East China Normal University, ShangHai, 200241
  • Received:2010-08-08 Revised:2011-01-30 Online:2012-02-27 Published:2012-02-28

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摘要： 随着政府近年来对高技术计划项目的投资力度不断加大,作为项目承担主体的科研机构的道德风险问题越来越突出。因此,亟需设计一套科学合理的激励与约束机制,来提高科研机构的研发效率。为此,本文基于委托-代理理论,构建了高技术计划项目分段投资的激励契约设计模型,并分析在此模型下科研机构的分阶段选择努力水平,研究了分段投资和激励契约在减轻科研机构道德风险中的作用,最后对政府的高技术计划项目的投资管理提出了对策建议。

关键词: 高技术计划项目, 道德风险, 分段投资, 激励契约

Abstract: Recently, along with the increasing of the government investment for hi-tech plan projects, the moral hazard originated from these science research institutes becomes more and more severe. Designing a set of appropriate mechanisms for the incentive and restraint to improve the research efficiency of these institutes is desiderated. Based on the principle-agent theory, an incentive contract model for staged investment in hi-tech plan projects is established, and the staged strive levels of these science institutes are analyzed. Then, the role of staged investment and incentive contract for mitigating moral hazard of the sciense research institutes is reseached. Finally, some suggestions for the investment management of hi-tech plan projects are put forward.

Key words: hi-tech project, moral hazard, staged investment, incentive contract

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