技术进步与高端制造业贸易网络研究

科研管理 ›› 2023, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (7): 50-59.

技术进步与高端制造业贸易网络研究

杨文珂¹,马钱挺²,何建敏³,苏屹⁴,赵一成³

1.南京邮电大学经济学院，江苏南京210023；
2.南京农业大学金融学院，江苏南京210095；
3.东南大学经济管理学院，江苏南京211189；
4.哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院，黑龙江哈尔滨150001

收稿日期:2021-08-23 修回日期:2022-01-27 出版日期:2023-07-20 发布日期:2023-07-20
通讯作者: 马钱挺
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目：“流动性循环与金融系统安全：影响机制及其监控研究”（72173018，2021—2024)；中央高校基本科研业务费人文社科基金项目：“基于计算实验的农村信贷风险传染机制及其监控策略研究”(SKYC2021021, 2021.05—2023.04)；黑龙江省重点研发计划指导类项目：“龙江科技安全评价及全方位式风险管理策略研究”（GZ20210003,2022—2023)。

Research on the relationship between technological progress and global advanced manufacturing trade network

Yang Wenke¹, Ma Qianting², He Jianmin³, Su Yi⁴, Zhao Yicheng³

1.School of Economics, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210023, Jiangsu, China;
2.School of Finance, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, Jiangsu, China;
3.School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, China;
4.School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, Heilongjiang, China

Received:2021-08-23 Revised:2022-01-27 Online:2023-07-20 Published:2023-07-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文旨在通过网络分析方法、一般均衡模型及引力模型探索技术进步与高端制造业中间、最终产品出口贸易网络间的内在机制，利用2005—2014年43个国家（地区）的面板数据，基于高维固定效应泊松拟极大似然估计（PPML-HDFE），实证研究发现：首先，全球高端制造业贸易规模呈现出明显的“幂律尾部”特征。其次，全球高端制造业中间、最终产品贸易网络呈现出明显的“核心-边缘”结构，德国、中国和美国在高端制造业中间、最终产品贸易网络中的重要性排名位于前三。更为重要的是，技术进步对高端制造业中间、最终产品出口贸易相对地位有显著的抑制作用，且二者间的关系会受到军事力量的中介作用。此外，技术进步、军事力量对高端制造业贸易网络的影响存在贸易协定签署异质性与经济发展异质性特征。一方面，签订贸易协定下，技术进步对高端制造业中间产品出口贸易相对地位的抑制作用虽会显著增强，军事力量对高端制造业中间产品出口贸易相对地位的负向影响将明显减弱。另一方面，签订贸易协定下，技术进步对高端制造业最终产品出口贸易相对地位的负向影响明显减弱。此外，签订贸易协定对最终产品出口贸易相对地位的影响亦存在显著组间差异。本研究对技术进步与高端制造业贸易关系进行延伸，为促进全球高端制造业出口贸易，优化全球高端制造产业结构与布局，探究其出口贸易相对地位的影响因素方面提供新的观点与机制。

关键词: 技术进步, 高端制造业, 中间产品, 最终产品, 贸易网络, 高维固定效应泊松拟极大似然估计（PPML-HDFE）

Abstract: Clarifying the trade network distribution of the intermediate products and final products of the global advanced manufacturing and its dynamic evolution process is beneficial to understanding and breaking trade shackles. This research aims to fill this gap and investigate the interdependency among technological progress, military strength and global advanced manufacturing trade network by using the global data of 43 countries (regions) obtained through network analysis from 2005-2014, a general equilibrium model, gravity models and the PPML-HDFE method.
In the light of empirical research, we can obtain the following results. First, the trade scale of intermediate products is significantly higher than final products in the whole decade, and the global trade in advanced manufacturing shows obvious power law tail characteristics. Then, the global intermediate products trade network of the global advanced manufacturing appears to have manifest core-periphery structures, and so have the final products trade network. In addition, DEU, CHN and USA rank TOP 3 in the importance of intermediate products trade networks, and so do DEU, CHN and ESP in final products trade networks. Furthermore, we also find that the influences of technological progress on the relative position of intermediate products and final products export in advanced manufacturing are significant negative, which is not in the traditional sense and means that the tendency of a country′s(region′s) technological progress is opposite to its relative position of export. Meanwhile, the relationship between technological progress and export trade is mediated by military strength.
Moreover, the influences of technological progress and military strength on the relative position of advanced manufacturing have heterogeneous characteristics of trade agreement signing and economic development. On the one hand, signing trade agreements between countries(regions) can significantly strengthen the negative effect of technological progress on the relative position of export trade of intermediate products of advanced manufacturing, however it may relieve the destructive effect of military strength on that of intermediate products and final products. Besides, signing trade agreements between countries(regions) can significantly weaken the negative effect of technological progress on the relative position of final products export. On the other hand, the more developed the countries(regions) are, the less likely they are to break the existing global pattern of export trade of advanced manufacturing. Much worse, the "crowding out effect" on the development of intermediate products export in advanced manufacturing may happen when these advantage countries(regions) blindly pursue technological progress.
This research extends the mechanism between technological progress and trade network of advanced manufacturing, and provides a new viewpoint for improving the structure and layout of the global advanced manufacturing and exploring its influencing factors. Above all, this paper reckons that the government ought to focus on the whole cycle of inter-regional trade of advanced manufacturing. Specifically, the periphery region should strengthen the regional trade links with sub-core regions and core regions, and further the trade cooperation of advanced manufacturing within the region to realize the "three cycles" of inter-region trade of advanced manufacturing, namely "the cycle between the core regions and sub-core regions", "the cycle between core regions", and "the cycle between the periphery regions and sub-core regions".

Key words: technological progress, advanced manufacturing, intermediate product, final product, trade network, PPML-HDFE method

杨文珂马钱挺何建敏苏屹赵一成. 技术进步与高端制造业贸易网络研究[J]. 科研管理, 2023, 44(7): 50-59.

Yang Wenke, Ma Qianting, He Jianmin, Su Yi, Zhao Yicheng. Research on the relationship between technological progress and global advanced manufacturing trade network[J]. Science Research Management, 2023, 44(7): 50-59.

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