专利授权时滞的延长风险及其效应分析

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5): 139-145.

专利授权时滞的延长风险及其效应分析

文家春

华中科技大学,湖北武汉 430074

收稿日期:2011-07-19 修回日期:2012-02-28 出版日期:2012-05-27 发布日期:2012-05-20
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71003037,起止时间:2011.01~2013.12);中国博士后科学基金(项目编号:20100480895,起止时间:2011.01~2011.12)。

The risk caused by patent grant delay and its effect

Wen Jiachun

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2011-07-19 Revised:2012-02-28 Online:2012-05-27 Published:2012-05-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 受多重因素的影响,包括我国专利局在内的全球主要专利局面临越来越严重审查积压问题,由此给专利系统带来了授权时滞延长的风险。本文通过分析影响专利授权时滞的因素,探讨了专利授权时滞延长产生的效应,并通过简单模型的分析,发现专利授权时滞延长会扭曲竞争、阻碍技术创新。为此,本文提出我国专利局应及时改革审查模式,并审慎选择政策模式。在进行政策选择时,可借鉴美国的快速审查模式,但应在快速审查模式中通过设置和调整快速审查请求费的方式控制提出快速审查请求的数量。

关键词: 专利授权时滞, 市场效应, 技术创新效应, 专利快速审查

Abstract: Under the multiple influencial factors, almost all the patent offices across the world including Chinese patent office are now facing the increasingly severe overstock problem, which results in the risk of patent grant delay. The impacts caused by patent grant delay is explored by analyzing the underlying influential factors; meanwhile, by constructing a simple model, it is found that the patent grant delay will distort competition and impair technological innovation. Therefore, it is suggested that Chinese patent office should reform the patent examination model immediately and formulate policies cautiously. When making patent-related policies, American patent rapid examination pattern should be used for reference. However more importantly, by setting and modulating request fees in the pattern of fast examination to bring the total number of applications for patent rapid examination under the control.

Key words: patent grant delay, market effect, technology innovation effect, patent rapid examination

中图分类号:

F062.4

文家春. 专利授权时滞的延长风险及其效应分析[J]. 科研管理, 2012, 33(5): 139-145.

Wen Jiachun. The risk caused by patent grant delay and its effect[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, 33(5): 139-145.

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