科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 126-130 .

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

技术不确定的研发项目投资时机期权博弈分析

夏轶群，陈俊芳   



  1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，上海200052
  • 收稿日期:2008-05-05 修回日期:2008-06-09 出版日期:2009-01-01 发布日期:2009-01-01

Option-game analysis for the entrance time of R&D projects investment under technologic uncertainty

Xia Yiqun, Chen Junfang   

  1. Antai College of Economy and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China
  • Received:2008-05-05 Revised:2008-06-09 Online:2009-01-01 Published:2009-01-01

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摘要： 抢先还是等待？研发项目投资时机的期权博弈分析表明，单头垄断时，企业只要考虑延迟投资带来的价值；而双头垄断可以有两种均衡：合作投资价值VC始终大于先动投资价值VL时，合作投资是均衡，但会晚于单头垄断时；VC与VL存在交点时则形成先动者-跟随者均衡，竞争将投资临界点提前。

关键词: 研发项目, 投资时机, 期权博弈, 均衡

Abstract: To be preemptive or waiting? The analysis on the entrance time of R&D project investment using option-game theory shows that the monopoly considers only the value of deferred investment. But there are two types of equilibriums for the duopoly, namely, the cooperative investment equilibrium which is invested later than that for the monopoly when the value of cooperation is always larger than that of preemption investment; and the leader-follower equilibrium when the two types of investment values have an intersection. Moreover, the critical point of investment is advanced because of the competition.

Key words: R&D project, entrance time, option-game, equilibrium

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