科研管理

科研管理

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 政府补贴对企业融投资意愿和收益的影响研究

 李晋，沈江，傅利平   

  1.   天津大学 管理与经济学部，天津300072
  • 出版日期:2020-12-20 发布日期:2020-12-16
  • 通讯作者: 李晋
  • 基金资助:
     

 A research on the influence of government subsidies on enterprises′ willingness for and income from financing and investment

Li Jin, Shen Jiang, Fu Liping   

  1.  Department of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
  • Online:2020-12-20 Published:2020-12-16
  • Supported by:
     

摘要：  针对政府补贴政策及其激励机制能否缓解企业技术创新过程中的融资约束，并有效地促进企业技术创新意愿和研发投入等问题，提出了一种采用序贯博弈模型进行政策仿真分析的新方法。其方法特点在于能够借助数据仿真来研究不同情景下的政府、企业以及融资机构之间的关系，对其可能产生的各种合作博弈行为进行刻画，并给出了采用数据空间阈值进行判别和界定的新模式，从而使政策分析更具普适性和可选择性。此外，本研究讨论了补贴政策及其激励机制的动态性问题，提出可以通过改变企业以及竞争者的收益函数来改变双方在市场竞争中的地位，从而形成更加有利于创新成长的生态圈的观点。在政策建议上，根据仿真分析的结论，提出了建立“项目后评估机制”及其相应反馈、采取动态可调整的补贴分配方式、建立企业技术创新“数字行为画像”的精准辨识与决策来进一步完善政策制定等具体措施。

 

关键词:  , 政府补贴；融资约束；技术创新；序贯博弈

Abstract:   Due to high risk, high uncertainty and lack of guaranty of enterprise technology innovation projects, enterprises often face financing constraint, which is further aggravated by problems such as asymmetric information, opportunism, adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition, when the market follower can complete this process at a lower cost, the innovation activities of enterprises will face the risk of horizontal competition, which will reduce the innovation willingness of enterprises. From a macro perspective, the intervention of government fiscal subsidies is effective in promoting technology innovation of enterprises. However, there are still arguments on the intervention time, strength and actual effect and most of the literatures provide case studies carried out based on some individual cases, lacking of more universal data analysis, modeling and policy simulation research. Based on the current situation, this paper discusses the time, strength and actual effect of the government′s subsidy policy and its incentive mechanism to alleviate financing constraint in the process of technology innovation. From the perspectives of capital input, input/output ratio and benefit, the paper analyzes the dynamic game situation between enterprises and financing institutions and between enterprises and competitors in the same industry. Furthermore, a new method for parameter space analysis and policy simulation based on sequential game model is proposed. On the basis of Hotelling model, Fudenberg model and Tirole model in a duopoly market, a revenue function model based on sequential game involving government, financing institutions and enterprises is established. The Hotelling model is used to describe the market competition between enterprises and their competitors, while the Fudenberg model and Tirole model are used to simulate the competition and its process of enterprise technology innovation. This constitutes the first-level game model between enterprises and financing institutions and the second-level game model between enterprises and their competitors in the same industry. The government intervention model and its adjustment strategy will be realized based on the two levels of game process. Based on the above models, this paper constructs a solution to the interaction mechanism among government, enterprises and financing institutions in different situations. It adopts the backward induction method for numerical simulation analysis, providing the problem space formed under different boundary conditions and its optimal solution threshold, so as to determine the optimal strategy for enterprises, competitors and financing institutions under government intervention. Besides, this paper focuses on analyzing the relation mode between government intervention and financing time, innovation willingness and R & D expenditure of enterprises. 

In order to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies, a new model is further proposed to distinguish and define the effectiveness of government subsidies by adopting data space thresholds, so as to make policy analysis more universal and optional. In addition, the paper simulates the income and R & D input of enterprises and financing institutions under different levels of government subsidies, then obtaining the "digital portrait" of various possible cooperative game behaviors among government, enterprises and financing institutions. 1) In view of the first-level game situation, this paper establishes the function of corporate income and financing time, and compares the influence of government subsidies on the optimal financing time of enterprises. The results show that when the government subsidy coefficient is lower than the threshold , the optimal financing time is directly proportional to the government subsidy, and the positive effect of the government subsidy is marginally incremental. 2) In view of the second-level game situation, this paper analyzes the relationship between the relative income of enterprises and government subsidies. 〖JP2〗Due to the existence of competitors in the industry, enterprises will take the lead in technological innovation only when the benefits of technological innovation are higher than those of followers. This shows that government subsidies and enterprises′ comparative competitive advantage are in an "inverted U" relationship. That is, only when  is in the range of (0.05, 0.172), government subsidies can be helpful to improve the technology innovation willingness of enterprises. 3) This paper analyzes the R & D input of enterprises in the process of the two levels of game. It is found that government subsidy has obvious crowding-out effect, which is related to R & D cost and government subsidy coefficient and a threshold  exists. When the ratio of the government subsidy coefficient and the enterprise R & D cost is lower than the threshold , the government subsidy can effectively promote R & D input of enterprises. The threshold  is directly proportional to the government subsidy coefficient and the R & D cost of enterprises. 〖JP〗
Finally, based on the above conclusions, this paper provides the following suggestions on the subsidy policies: 1) Within the scope of research, the positive effect of government subsidies on the financing time of enterprises is marginally incremental. This is because government subsidies will reduce the R & D cost of enterprises to a certain extent. At this time, enterprises may choose to employ their own funds more to support technology innovation, so as to reduce enterprises′ dependence on external funds and financing costs. This shows that the government subsidy alleviates the capital constraint of enterprises and its effect is also marginally incremental. Therefore, the investment time and intensity of government subsidy need to be accurately controlled and further determined through establishment of targeted evaluation system and feedback mechanism, and the subsidy policy should be adjusted in a timely manner. 2) Appropriate government subsidy is more helpful to give full play to the relative competitive advantage of enterprises, but its effect is diminishing marginally. However, excessive increase of the amount of government subsidies will have a negative impact on the advantages of enterprises. Therefore, the subsidy policy should be more dynamic, in order to encourage other competitors to catch up with and surpass the enterprise, thus to form an innovative and competitive environment and an ecosystem conducive to innovation growth. 3) The policy simulation method can be used to establish a "digital portrait" describing the past innovation behaviors, to compare the behavior data of funded projects, to complete a deeper level of prior project selection. 4) Government subsidies also play a symbolic role in financing institutions. Therefore, in the formulation of policies, such symbolic influence should be considered to improve the participation of financing institutions. This will also reduce the crowding-out effect due to the dependence of enterprises on subsidies.

Key words:  government subsidy, financing constraint, technological innovation, sequential game

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