代理冲突与企业技术创新关系的实证分析

科研管理 ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (11): 60-67.

代理冲突与企业技术创新关系的实证分析

吕新军

河南大学经济学院, 河南开封 475004

收稿日期:2012-09-28 修回日期:2013-04-03 出版日期:2014-11-25 发布日期:2014-11-21
作者简介:吕新军(1981-),男(汉),山东莱西人,河南大学经济学院副教授,经济学博士,硕士生导师,研究方向:技术创新管理与产业经济。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重大项目(11&ZD050):中西部地区承接产业转移的重点与政策研究,2011.10-2014.10;2013年河南省软科学项目(132400410022):制度之困——民营经济发展问题研究,2013.6-2014.6;河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2012BJJ043):"三化"协调发展背景下河南新型工业化发展动力对策研究,2012.9-2014.9;河南省高校社科重大攻关项目(2013-Z-005):农村转移人口离农机制研究,2013.6-2015.6。

Effect of agency conflicts on the innovation of listed companies in China

Lv Xinjun

School of Economics, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, Henan, China

Received:2012-09-28 Revised:2013-04-03 Online:2014-11-25 Published:2014-11-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文构建异质性随机边界技术创新模型,定量估算了我国上市公司的技术创新效率,分析了代理冲突对技术创新效率的影响。结果表明:(1)代理冲突问题使得中国上市公司的技术创新效率比最优水平低了25%-45%。(2)股权集中度和制衡度的提高以及高管激励政策的实施会显著降低代理冲突水平,提升企业的创新投入;机构持股不是影响代理冲突的关键因素。(3)样本期间内,国有控股上市公司技术创新效率呈现稳步增加趋势,渐渐高于非国有上市公司。

关键词: 创新效率, 创新约束, 代理冲突, 随机边界模型

Abstract: This paper estimates innovation efficiency of China's listed companies by constructing the heteroscedastic stochastic frontier model, and analyzes the impact of agency conflict on efficiency. The results show that: (1) the innovation efficiency of China's listed companies declines by 25%-45% due to agency conflicts; (2) Improvement of equity concentration and balance degree and implementation of executive incentive policy will significantly reduce the level of agency conflicts, and enhance investment in innovation; institutional ownership is not a key factor of technological innovation;(3) Innovation efficiency of state-controlled companies shows a steadily increasing trend and gradually higher than the non-state-owned listed companies during the sample period.

Key words: innovation efficiency, innovation constraints, agency conflicts, stochastic frontier model

中图分类号:

F425
F062.4

吕新军. 代理冲突与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J]. 科研管理, 2014, 35(11): 60-67.

Lv Xinjun. Effect of agency conflicts on the innovation of listed companies in China[J]. Science Research Management, 2014, 35(11): 60-67.

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