基于信息集交互的非合作审计动态策略研究

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (8): 106-112.

基于信息集交互的非合作审计动态策略研究

李昆, 时现, 曾晓红

南京审计学院, 江苏南京 211815

收稿日期:2011-02-19 修回日期:2011-07-08 出版日期:2012-08-27 发布日期:2012-08-15
基金资助:
江苏省公共工程审计重点实验室专项基金; 南京审计学院"审计科学与技术"江苏省高校优势学科建设专项基金; 中国内部审计协会内部审计发展研究中心专项基金; 国家审计基础理论研究项目(南京审计学院委托课题,子课题编号JZ2010001-11); 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71072039)。

Dynamic strategy research on non-cooperative audit basedon the reciprocity of information aggregation

Li Kun, Shi Xian, Zeng Xiaohong

Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Received:2011-02-19 Revised:2011-07-08 Online:2012-08-27 Published:2012-08-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对项目工程审计的复杂性、非合作性特征,本文选择在非合作动态博弈分析框架下,应用信息集交互理论,结合各类审计效率影响因素,构建了项目审计的双目标策略反应模型。模型针对项目工程审计中的策略行为进行了动态博弈分析。研究所获结论为:审计方应适度控制审计计划中触及项目工程关键信息的规模;减少重复性、非关键性信息审计作业的关键在于优化审与被审双方的关系模式;项目方对审计方策略反应的实质目标是审计方信息搜索的动机水平;审计过程中对关键审计信息的搜索动机应该予以策略性控制或隐匿。

关键词: 项目工程审计, 信息集交互, 策略反应, 关键审计信息

Abstract: Considering project engineering’s complexity and non-cooperative characters, a dual objects strategic response model that audit efficiency influence factors are combined with each other under the non-cooperative dynamic game analysis frame is built, and the strategic behaviors during project engineering audit are studied by using the reciprocity theory of information aggregation. The conclusions are as follows: Auditor better has the control on the scale of key information about project, optimizes the relation pattern between auditor and project deputy in order to reduce those repeated and non-key information works, the essential object of strategic response by project deputy is the motivation level of information seeking by auditor, and the information seeking motivation of auditor should be strategically controlled or hidden.

Key words: project engineering audit, reciprocity of information aggregation, strategy reaction, key audit information

中图分类号:

F273.4

李昆, 时现, 曾晓红. 基于信息集交互的非合作审计动态策略研究[J]. 科研管理, 2012, (8): 106-112.

Li Kun, Shi Xian, Zeng Xiaohong. Dynamic strategy research on non-cooperative audit basedon the reciprocity of information aggregation[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, (8): 106-112.

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