Abstract: Using the data of manufacture and information technology industries in 2011-2015 as the sample, this paper executed the empirical tests by diving them in different institutional environments groups and analyzes the effect of characteristics of mixed ownership enterprises′ control rights on their R&D innovation behavior. With the Tobit model, it is found that the directors and supervisors as non-state property representatives who share the control rights in the mixed ownership enterprises inhibit the R&D innovation of the enterprises. It is also pointed out that the marketization process of mixed ownership is closely related to the corporate governance effect. After social capitals enter the mixed ownership enterprise, it will change the ownership structure and control rights structure of the enterprise. However, the institutional context influences the relationship between them deeply. Only by combining this change with the improvement of the institutional environment, the mixed ownership reform can play a more active role in the R&D innovation of the enterprise. Compared with those regions where the institutional environment is not well built, the corporate governance characteristics of mixed ownership enterprises in the regions where institutional context is better are more conducive to stimulating the R&D innovation of enterprises and restrain the entrenchment effect. According to the research findings, it is believed that, first of all, it should be continued to deepen the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China. Compared with other ownership rights, the R&D innovation ability of state-owned enterprises is insufficient. However, R&D innovation is the core and foundation for enterprises to maintain competitiveness. The reform of mixed ownership system is an important measure to improve the overall innovation ability of state-owned enterprises and further to improve the efficiency of the operations of the enterprises.  Secondly, enterprises should establish efficient and reasonable corporate governance structure. As the core department of corporate governance, the composition and operation mechanism of the board of directors is the key to solve the principal-agent problem and improve the efficiency of enterprises. The reform of mixed ownership system and the introduction of diversified social capitals into state-owned enterprises can solve the issues of supervision failure and insider control. It is also very important to keep a good board governance during the mixed ownership reform by attracting civil society capital into enterprises to diversify the equities and share control rights with them. A reasonable corporate governance structure and the allocation of control rights are the key steps to carry out the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises and finally integrate all ownership rights. Finally, the success of the mixed ownership system reform depends on the good legal environment. The improvement of institutional environment is also good to the optimization of innovation environment. Therefore, the improvement of laws and regulations is conducive to the full protection of the interests of shareholders as well as the full protection of R&D innovation results. The government should actively create a healthy and fair institutional environment for enterprises, so that investors and entrepreneurs can form long-term stable expectations.

Key words: mixed ownership, control right, institutional context, R&D innovation