科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2019, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (5): 244-253.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

董事会社会资本、CEO权力与企业研发投资的关系研究—来自创业板上市公司的经验证据

王楠1,2，黄静1，王斌1   

  1. 1.北京工商大学商学院，北京100037；
    2.清华大学技术创新研究中心，北京100084
  • 收稿日期:2016-01-19 修回日期:2019-01-23 出版日期:2019-05-20 发布日期:2019-05-21
  • 通讯作者: 王楠
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目：“企业网络创新社区中用户在线参与创新行为影响因素及用户间互动作用机制研究”（71602006）；辽宁省自然科学基金项目(20170540669)；国家自然科学基金面上项目：“高管团队的权力分布及其经济后果研究”（71672003）；国家社会科学基金面上项目：“中国上市公司股东资源研究”（17BJY211）。

A research on the relationship between board social capital and CEO power on R&D investment:An evidence from the GEM Listed Corporation

Wang Nan1,2, Huang Jing1, Wang Bin1   

  1. 1. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100037, China;
    2. Center for Technological Innovation Research, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2016-01-19 Revised:2019-01-23 Online:2019-05-20 Published:2019-05-21

摘要： 以2010-2014年我国创业板上市公司为研究对象，结合资源依赖理论和管理权力理理论，从董事会社会资本的视角出发，探讨董事会如何通过与外部环境其他主体的联系影响企业创新战略的实施，以及CEO权力对董事会社会资本与企业研发投资关系的调节作用。实证研究发现：（1）董事会商业联系与企业研发投资显著正相关，其中董事参与行业协会显著促进企业研发投资，而董事兼职其他公司对企业研发投资没有促进作用；（2）由于“政策性负担”的存在，董事会政治联系对企业研发投资具有消极影响，其中代表类政治联系与企业研发投资显著负相关，而官员类政治联系对企业研发投资没有影响；（3）创业板企业的CEO具有“管家精神”，CEO权力对董事会商业联系与企业研发投资关系的调节作用不显著，但CEO权力显著降低董事会政治联系、代表类政治联系对企业研发投资的消极影响；（4）除CEO结构性权力外，CEO所有权权力、专家权力和声望权力均对代表类政治联系与企业研发投资的关系具有显著的负向调节作用。

关键词: 董事会社会资本, CEO权力, 研发投资

Abstract: As the main bridge to connect enterprise with external environment, board of directors provide convenient access for enterprise to obtain key information and crucial resources. Therefore, board of directors play a key role in selecting, formulating and implementing the corporation strategy decisions. Resource dependence theory believes that board of directors’ social capital leads the board managing the enterprises, offering them advice and affects their suggestions and resources. The data of GEM listed companies during 2010 to 2014 was collected as a sample for empirical analysis. This paper investigates the relationship between R&D investment and board social capital which is divided into political connection and business connection.Although directors who possess social capital can provide resources needed for R&D, they also need motivation to perform these tasks effectively. Except for the boards, the CEO is also responsible to allocate the resources and make the strategic decisions. The CEO who owns the high power has the ability influencing the board’s decision making. Besides, the interaction between the CEO and board could affect the quality of the decision making. This article extends view of board dependence, and discusses CEO power's moderate influence between board social capital and R&D investmentWe found that: (1) There is a significant positive correlation between board business connection and R & D investment. (2) The board political connection is significantly negative on R&D investment; (3) With the spirit of the housekeeper, the high power of CEO is significantly negative moderate between board political connection and R&D investment.This paper’s main theoretical contributions indicated in the following areas: firstly, the existing research about impact of the board of directors on R&D investment has been expanded. The past researches always focused on the characteristics variable like board composition and board size, neglecting the vital role of board’s social capital. Using resource dependence theory to explain how the board affects R&D investment through the guidance and resources provided by the directors, exploits a new perspective on the relationship between board and R&D. Secondly, establishing a relationship between the board’s social capital, CEO power and R&D investment. It is suggested that when board social capital play resource providing role for R&D investment, the CEO power’s potential moderating effect should be considered. Empirical research about the impact of CEO power on board’s resources providing fills the gap between the board social capital and R&D investment. It has deepened the understanding of the relationship between the two and also filled a void in the literature on the relationship among the three.Thirdly, in response to previous research on how the CEO-Board relationship affects the board's resource-dependent role and strategic decision-making, we propose that board of directors need additional motivation to provide resources and clarify an important regulatory variable—CEO power. This is consistent with discussion about the deficiencies of previous resource-dependent theories, which neglected the importance of motivation in terms of board capital and resource allocation relationships. By demonstrating how CEO power influences the resource-dependent role of directors in R&D investment decisions, it not only supplements the literature on resource dependence theory, but also explores an important topic in the field of corporate governance research—the black box of the relationship between CEOs and directors, and also complements to the rising but still immature theory about how the CEO-board interaction impacts organizational achievement.Fourthly, the former studies about the agency theory mostly uses the directly obtained substitution variable like the ratio of internal board members to external board members, and reports a mixing result. Basing on different subjects enterprises establishing external relations with, we divides the board social capital into detailed dimensions, enriching the connotation and extension of the board social capital. In depth study about the impact of different relationships social capital is formed by, and it supplements the previous research on the overall impact of board’s social capital. This study provides suggestions and support for making full use of board social capital and CEO housekeeping spirit, and forming strategic alliances between board and CEO.

Key words: board social capital, CEO power, R&D investment