科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2018, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (3): 45-58.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同权力结构下考虑搭便车行为的闭环供应链决策研究

李新然，刘媛媛，俞明南   

  1. 大连理工大学 管理与经济学部，辽宁 大连116024
  • 出版日期:2018-03-20 发布日期:2018-03-16
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金项目资助课题（14BGL063）（2014年6月15日—至今）；中央高校基本科研业务费资助，项目批准号:DUT17RW221。

A research on the closed-loop supply chain decision-making considering free riding behavior under different authority structure

Li Xinran, Liu Yuanyuan,Yu Mingnan   

  1. Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, Liaoning, China
  • Online:2018-03-20 Published:2018-03-16

摘要： 本文针对单个制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链系统，基于博弈论的基本方法，分别构建了集中式、制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商和零售商存在Nash均衡博弈等模式下的闭环供应链决策模型，进而对比分析消费者搭便车行为对不同权力结构闭环供应链的决策及利润等影响问题。研究表明，集中式决策闭环供应链的总利润和分散式决策中各权力主体的利润受到搭便车系数的影响；各权力结构下网络直销渠道的销售价格和市场需求均随搭便车系数的增加而增加等。

关键词: 不同权力结构, 搭便车行为, 闭环供应链, 决策

Abstract: This article, which depends on the breakthrough point of Consumer Free Riding Behavior aiming at the closed-loop supply chain system composed of the single manufacturers and retailers, studies how Consumer Free Riding Behavior affects the policy, channel and profit of the different authority structure of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) based on the game theory by constructing the decision-making models of centralized decision, manufacture-Stackelberg game, retailer-Stackelberg game and manufacture-retailer Nash Equilibrium respectively. The research shows that the total profit of the centralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain and the profit of authorities under the decentralized decision-making of the Stackelberg game leading by manufacturer are influenced by the free-riding coefficient. The price of direct channel and market requirement increases with the increase of free riding coefficient in all condition.

Key words: different authority structure, free riding behavior, closed-loop supply chain, decision