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      科研管理 2017, Vol. 38 Issue       (12) :122-133 论文   DOI:
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       服务商道德风险与资金限制下的研发外包契约选择:奖励还是惩罚
       宋寒1,2,邵云飞1,代应2
        1.电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川 成都611731;
2.重庆理工大学管理学院,重庆400054
       Contract selection under moral hazard and capital restrictions of service providers in R&D outsourcing: Punishments or rewards
       Song Han1,2, Shao Yunfei1, Dai Ying2
       1. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, China; 
2. School of Business Administration, Chongqing University of Technology, Chongqing 400054, China
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摘要 针对研发外包中服务商道德风险防范与激励问题,在考虑服务商自有资金限制下,设计了奖励成功、惩罚失败、奖—惩混合的研发外包契约,并对三种契约的可行性与有效性进行了比较,得到各类契约的选择条件。研究表明,奖-惩混合契约完全等价奖励契约或者惩罚契约,而服务商资金实力是影响契约可行性与有效性的关键因素。具体而言,当服务商资金实力很差,具有较大负债时,奖励与惩罚契约均不可行,客户不应该把研发项目外包给此类企业;而随着服务商资金实力的增加,负债减少到一定程度时,首先是惩罚契约可行,此后当服务商资金实力继续增加到一定程度,奖励契约才可行,并且惩罚契约优于奖励契约;当服务资金实力强到一定程度后,奖励契约与惩罚契约均可行,且二者等价。
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宋寒
邵云飞
代应
关键词研发外包   道德风险   资金限制   奖励成功   惩罚失败     
Abstract: o solve the problems of prevention and incentive of service providers’ moral hazard in R & D outsourcing, this paper designed three kinds of R&D outsourcing contracts, which are rewarding the success, punishing the failure, and linking rewards and punishment with considering the service providers’ own capital restrictions, and then the feasibility and effectiveness of this three kinds of contracts were compared to get the optimal choice of their practical conditions. Research shows that the contract which links rewards and punishment together is completely equivalent to the rewards contract or the punishment contract, while the financial strength of service providers is the key factor which can affect the feasibility and effectiveness of the contract. Specifically, when the service providers have poor financial strength as well as a large debt, the reward and punishment contracts are not feasible, and the clients should not outsource R&D projects to such enterprises. As the financial strength of service providers increases and the debt reduces to a certain extent, the punishment contract is first feasible. Then, the financial strength of service providers keeps on increasing to a certain degree, the reward contract will be feasible, but the effectiveness of punishment contract is better than reward contract. Until the financial strength of service providers is powerful enough, the reward contract and punishment contract are both feasible, and there is no difference between them.
Keywords R&D outsourcing   moral hazard   capital restriction   rewarding success   punishing failure     
Received 2015-05-14; published 2017-12-19
Fund:

国家自然科学基金项目“知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究”(71301182,2014.01—2016.12);国家自然科学基金项目“新一代信息技术产业“联盟组合”与创新能力研究:涌现、构型与治理”(71572028,2016.01—2019.12)。

Corresponding Authors: 宋寒     Email: songhan_0@126.com
引用本文:   
宋寒 邵云飞 代应.服务商道德风险与资金限制下的研发外包契约选择:奖励还是惩罚[J]  科研管理, 2017,V38(12): 122-133
Song Han, Shao Yunfei, Dai Ying.Contract selection under moral hazard and capital restrictions of service providers in R&D outsourcing: Punishments or rewards[J]  Science Research Management, 2017,V38(12): 122-133
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