科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (12): 134-143.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

制度诱拐、金融拖累与能力退化：以通用电气(GE)为例

孙喜   

  1. 首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院，北京100071
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-16 修回日期:2017-03-27 出版日期:2017-12-20 发布日期:2017-12-19
  • 通讯作者: 孙喜
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金青年项目（批准号:71403176，起止时间：2015.1-2017.12）;国家自然科学基金面上项目（批准号:71273181，起止时间：2013.1-2016.12）;北京市教委社科计划重点项目（批准号：SZ20171003823,起止时间：2017.1-2019.12）。

Institutional traps, financial burden and capability involution by taking General Electric (GE) as an example

Sun Xi   

  1. School of Business Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100071, China
  • Received:2016-03-16 Revised:2017-03-27 Online:2017-12-20 Published:2017-12-19

摘要： 恰当处理制造业务与增值服务之间的关系，是系统集成商控摄和升级价值链的核心任务；其中外部制度是影响“制造-服务关系”的重要力量。本文以通用电气(GE)为例，分析过去三十年金融资本主义兴起对美国系统集成商能力演进的影响。文章指出，金融化导向的制度设计诱拐了企业的价值取向，扭曲了系统集成商的制造与服务业务、尤其是金融业务之间的关系，并最终导致了其能力退化。这一解释不仅有助于我们理解金融化制度设计对产业升级的影响，而且能够帮助我们看清美国“再工业化”进程的前景。文末就此进行了总结和政策讨论。

关键词: 金融化, 系统集成, 通用电气, 股东价值最大化

Abstract: The fundamental task for system integrators who control and upgrade the global value chain is to properly handle the relationship between manufacturing and services, and the institutional environment is a crucial power to shape this relationship. Here we take GE as an example to analyze the effect of financial capitalism on the capability evolution of the US-based system integrators in past three decades. It shows that financialization-oriented institutions not only abduct the values of corporations and “manufacturing-service/finance” relationship, but also lead to capability involution in system integrators. This explanation is useful for us to understand both the role of financial capitalism in industrial upgrading and the future of Re-industrilization in US. The final part gives further discussion based on the case.

Key words: financialization, system integration, general electric (GE), shareholder value maximization (SVM)