科研管理 ›› 2017, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (8): 110-116.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业支持员工创意开发策略研究—基于知识产权配置的视角

史青春,妥筱楠   

  1. 兰州大学 管理学院,甘肃 兰州730000
  • 收稿日期:2015-04-22 修回日期:2016-11-20 出版日期:2017-08-20 发布日期:2017-08-18
  • 通讯作者: 史青春
  • 基金资助:

    基金项目:教育部人文社科基金“创意交易及其间接定价策略研究——基于有信息的委托人视角”(13YJC630133,起止日期:2013.5-2016.5);兰州大学“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金——创意项目的众筹机制设计与风险管理研究”(16LZUJBWZY002,起止日期:2016.7-2017.12)。

A research on the enterprise strategy to support its employee’s creative idea development from the view of intellectual property allocation

Shi Qingchun, Tuo Xiaonan   

  1. School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, China
  • Received:2015-04-22 Revised:2016-11-20 Online:2017-08-20 Published:2017-08-18

摘要: 为了分析企业支持员工的创意开发策略,本文以委托代理理论、激励理论为基础,将创意的知识产权收益从企业剩余收益中独立出来,通过构建模型,研究了创意知识产权的不同配置对企业激励契约的影响。研究表明:(1)企业对创意者的激励强度不仅取决于创意产品的内部剩余,而且还依赖于来自创意知识产权的外部剩余。(2)创意的价值和创意特许的价值侵蚀对创意知识产权配置策略及其激励契约都会产生影响。具体来说,对于一个具有较高经济价值的创意,在企业支持开发的激励契约中,如果特许对企业的价值侵蚀不大,将创意的知识产权配置给创意者可以节约企业的激励成本;如果特许给企业带来较大的价值侵蚀,企业偏好拥有创意的知识产权以阻止特许;如果特许给企业带来的价值侵蚀非常大,则在激励契约中附加一些带有惩罚性的约束条款,将知识产权赋予创意者可能更有效。研究丰富了创意管理的相关理论成果,为我国企业制定针对创意员工的激励契约提供了策略性建议。

关键词: 创意开发, 知识产权配置, 特许, 激励契约

Abstract: In order to analyze the corporate strategy of supporting employees to develop creative idea, our research is based on principal-agent theory and incentive theory, separating intellectual property income of creative idea from corporate residual income, studying the effects that different allocations of intellectual property of creative idea have on corporate incentive contracts by building models. We find (1) the incentive that corporate provides to employees (innovators) depends on not only internal residual of creative products, but also external residual results from intellectual property of creative idea; (2) the value of creative idea and the value erosion of creative idea which caused by franchise would influence corporate strategy of allocating intellectual property of creative idea and incentive contract. Specifically, when it comes to a creative idea that is of high economic value, if value erosion caused by franchise is small in the incentive contract, corporate rather allocate the intellectual property of creative idea for employees (innovators) to save incentive cost; if value erosion caused by franchise is relatively great, corporate prefers owning the intellectual property of creative idea to prevent franchise; if value erosion caused by franchise is extremely great, it would become more effective for corporate that transferring intellectual property to employees(innovators) and adding some punitive restricted items into the incentive contract. Our research enriches the creative idea management theory and provides strategic advices for corporate to design incentive contracts with innovators.

Key words: creative idea development, intellectual property allocation, franchise, incentive contract