科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (11): 159-166.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

替代交易费用、资产专用性与农业自我实施合约

董晓波1,2，常向阳1   

  1. 1南京农业大学 经济管理学院，江苏 南京210095；
    2安徽财经大学 合作经济研究中心，安徽 蚌埠233041
  • 收稿日期:2014-10-24 修回日期:2016-04-11 出版日期:2016-11-20 发布日期:2016-11-17
  • 通讯作者: 董晓波
  • 基金资助:

    本文受到国家社会科学基金项目（16CJY055)资助，项目名称：转换成本对农业企业与农户间治理模式的影响研究。

Substitute Transaction Cost, Asset Specialty and Agricultural Self-Enforcing Contract

Dong Xiaobo1,2, Chang Xiangyang1   

  1. 1. College of Economic & Management, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, Jiangsu, China;
    2. Cooperative Economy Research Center, Anhui University of Finance and Economy, Bengbu 233041, Anhui, China
  • Received:2014-10-24 Revised:2016-04-11 Online:2016-11-20 Published:2016-11-17

摘要： 摘要：本文放宽已有研究遵循的“双边垄断”假设，从替代交易费用和资产专用性的视角，在一个更为现实的市场结构中说明了农业自我实施合约产生的条件。企业和农户替代交易费用越高、资产专用性程度越高，履约价格区间越大，自我实施合约产生的可能性越大。企业和农户的讨价还价能力是自身替代交易费用和资产专用性程度的减函数，是对方替代交易费用和资产专用性程度的增函数。这些结论解释了“订单农业”履约率低的现象，为有效发展农业产业化提供了理论依据。

关键词: 替代交易费用, 资产专用性, 成交价格, 自我实施合约

Abstract: Abstract: This paper analyzed the condition of agricultural self-enforcing contract，which was based on the substitute transaction cost and asset specialty in the relaxation of the assumption of bilateral monopoly. The higher of substitute transaction cost and the extent of asset specialty, the wider of the self-enforcing contract price interval. The bargaining power was the decreasing function of substitute transaction cost and extent of asset specialty. These conclusions explained the low performance of order agriculture, and provide the theory basis for the development of agricultural industrialization.

Key words: substitute transaction cost, asset specificity, transaction price, self-enforcement contract