科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2016, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (5): 78-86.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

基础创新与最优专利侵权补偿机制

董亮1，任剑新2，于飞1   

  1. 1桂林电子科技大学商学院，广西 桂林541004；
    2中南财经政法大学工商管理学院，湖北 武汉430073
  • 收稿日期:2014-07-01 修回日期:2015-12-19 出版日期:2016-05-20 发布日期:2016-05-06
  • 通讯作者: 董亮
  • 基金资助:

    基金项目：国家社会科学基金项目（15BJY002）。

Basic innovation and optimal compensation mechanism of patent infringement

Dong Liang1， Ren Jianxin2， Yu Fei1     

  1. 1.School of Business，Guilin University of Electronic Technology，Guilin 541004，Guangxi，China；
    2. School of Business Administration，Zhongnan University of Economics and Law，Wuhan 430073，Hubei，China
  • Received:2014-07-01 Revised:2015-12-19 Online:2016-05-20 Published:2016-05-06

摘要： 通过一个三方博弈模型，分析了产品差异化条件下利润损失规则和不当所得规则对基础研究型累积创新的保护作用，并在此基础上进行了最优专利侵权补偿机制的设计。结果表明，与不当所得规则相比，利润损失规则能够更好地保障专利持有者的利益。法院只有通过混合利用不同侵权补偿规制建立事前机制，对厂商行为进行间接引导，才能使社会福利达到最优。法院不应只是一个“仲裁者”，也应是一个“引导者”,在专利制度中发挥更加主动的作用。

关键词: 基础创新, 专利侵权, 利润损失规则, 不当所得规则

Abstract: Through a trilateral game model, this paper studies protective effect of the lost-royalty doctrine and the unjust-enrichment doctrine to the cumulative innovation of basic research respectively under the condition of product differentiation, and then analyses the optimal compensation mechanism of patent infringement on this basis. The results show that the lost-royalty doctrine could effectively maintain the benefit of patent holders compare with the unjust-enrichment doctrine. Only by mixed using the two compensation mechanism to build an ex-ante mechanism, the court could maximize the social welfare by guiding firms’ behavior indirectly. The court is not only a “arbiter” but also a “guide”, and plays a more proactive role in patent system.

Key words: basic innovation, patent infringement, lost-royalty doctrine, unjust-enrichment doctrine