科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2013, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (8): 75-81.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

盗版影响下厂商的反复制策略与政府监管政策

邓流生1, 张旭梅1,2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学 经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030;
    2. 庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室, 重庆 400030
  • 收稿日期:2011-12-27 修回日期:2012-09-03 出版日期:2013-08-27 发布日期:2013-08-15
  • 作者简介:邓流生(1971-),男(汉),江西赣州人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:信息管理、供应链管理。
    张旭梅(1966-),女(汉),四川仁寿人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授、博士生导师、博士,研究方向:知识管理、供应链管理。
  • 基金资助:

    国家863计划资助课题(2012AA040904,2012.01-2013.12);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086,2013.01-2016.12)。

Manufacturer’s anti-replication strategies and government’s regulation policy under the influence of piracy

Deng Liusheng1, Zhang Xumei1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
    2. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics at Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
  • Received:2011-12-27 Revised:2012-09-03 Online:2013-08-27 Published:2013-08-15

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摘要： 针对现实生活中存在的盗版产品与正版产品可能同质同价的问题,运用博弈论优化方法,建立了由正版厂商、盗版厂商和政府组成的信息产品市场的两阶段Stackelberg产量博弈模型,分析了正版厂商采取不同反复制策略时的市场均衡情况,以及社会福利最大化目标下政府的最优监管政策和正版厂商的策略选择。研究表明,正版厂商和政府在反盗版力量配置上存在此消彼长的博弈关系:当正版厂商采取强硬态度阻止盗版厂商的复制和进入时,政府将搭便车,放松或放弃监管;当正版厂商对盗版采取适度容忍态度时,政府将主动加强监管。作为正版厂商,采取主动的反复制策略总是有利的。政府应鼓励正版厂商积极提高反复制技术水平,并加强与企业的合作,共同打击盗版。

关键词: 信息产品, 盗版, 反复制, 政府监管, 政策

Abstract: Aiming at the problem that pirate products may have the same quality and prices with the genuine products in real life, this paper uses the optimization method of the game theory to establish a two-stage Stackelberg output game model composed of the genuine manufacturer, the pirate manufacturer and the government in the information market, analyzes the market equilibriums when the genuine manufacturer adopts different anti-replication strategies, and studies the government's optimal supervision policy and the genuine manufacturer's strategy choice under the circumstances where the social welfare is maximized. The research indicates that the relationship between the genuine manufacturer and government's anti-piracy efforts is like a game, in which when the genuine manufacturer toughly prevents the pirate manufacturer from entering the market, the government will choose to free-ride or slacken the supervision, but when the genuine manufacturer chooses to tolerate the pirate action moderately, the government will actively strengthen the supervision. As a genuine manufacturer, it is always beneficial to take the anti-replication strategy. And the government should encourage genuine manufacturers to reinforce their anti-replication technology and strengthen their cooperation with the genuine manufacturer to fight against piracy.

Key words: information product, piracy, anti-replication, government regulation, policy

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